

IN CAMERA

SENATE

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

(Reference: East Timor)

Transcript of Evidence

(Taken at Melbourne)

TUESDAY, 29 JUNE 1982

Present

Senator Scott (Chairman)

Senator Bolkus

Senator MacGibbon

Senator Hamer

Senator Primmer

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Mr Vincent John WADDINGHAM, 183 Gertrude Street, Fitzroy,  
Victoria, and

Father Christopher DUREAU, 175 Royal Parade, Parkville,  
Victoria,

were called and examined.

CHAIRMAN - Welcome, Mr Waddingham and Father Dureau. In what capacity do you appear?

Mr Waddingham - We appear as private citizens.

CHAIRMAN - The Committee has before it a submission prepared by you both. Are there any alterations or additions you would like to make to the document at this stage?

Mr Waddingham - I seek confirmation of whether the Committee received a set of documents in the last couple of weeks. I contacted Mr Magi; have they been received and distributed?

CHAIRMAN - They were circulated to the Committee members last week.

Mr Waddingham - There are two sets of material from us. One is our original submission and the other comprises documents in support of that and came later. We feel that we owe an apology, in a sense, because the original submission, rather than being a submission of detail, is an outline of the sorts of areas that we thought we could cover in verbal testimony. The short answer to your question is no, we do not have any particular corrections to make to the material that has been presented to you.

Father Dureau - There are several sets of documents that come from us. The documents to which we are referring are the documents that come in both our names. There are some documents that are separately presented from different organisations with which we have some association.

CHAIRMAN - Is it the wish of the Committee that the submission be incorporated in the record of proceedings? There being no objection, it is so ordered.

(The document read as follows) -

IN CAMERA

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE  
EAST TIMOR INQUIRY

SUBMISSION BY            John Waddingham  
                                 Christopher Dureau SJ

March 29, 1982

## 1. FOOD

Recent debate and publicity on the food situation in East Timor has concentrated on the issue of 'famine'. The data we have collected gives little support to the cautious optimism of media accounts. Evidence available to us suggests that food shortages and malnutrition are widespread and that these conditions are likely to continue unless basic changes occur in the administration of East Timor.

### 1.1 REPORT OF FOOD SITUATION:

A review of food needs in East Timor was compiled by East Timorese Church personnel. Reports were received from most regions of the territory. This review indicates that in late February:

- Serious food shortages can be expected in the next few months in parts of Lospalos, Baucau, Manatuto and Ainaro Kabupatens. Food shortages are expected in Liquica, Bobonaro and Viqueque. Information was not available for the administrative regions of Ermera, Covalima and Aileu. In parts of Maliana, Suai, Lospalos, Bobonaro conditions are reasonable.
- An estimated 236,000 people, or around half the population are thus facing insufficient food supplies for basic nourishment.
- Unfavourable conditions, late planting, lack of rain, land 'shortage', rat plagues and the weakened condition of agricultural workers will be responsible for unusually severe seasonal shortages in 70% of food areas.

### 1.2 SUPPORTING REMARKS

- Christian Church aid via several channels, provided for other welfare programs, has been diverted in recent months for emergency food assistance. All such aid was used very quickly.
- A Church-sponsored survey around Dili and Baucau in September 1981 concluded that malnutrition among children there was serious.
- Many people report that they have observed swollen stomachs, sunken yellow eyes and light skin - particularly among children.
- An International Red Cross official pointed out to us that the reports of "no famine" attributed to ICRC were valid only for the places they visited and only for the time they were there.
- An Indonesian army officer said it was easy to pick people who were associated with Fretilin because they were fatter than East Timorese in the towns.

### 1.3 REASONS FOR FOOD SHORTAGES

- Resettlement programs, fear and physical weakness have immobilised large sections of the workforce.
- War and military occupation have drained traditional food reserves.
- Distribution techniques are inadequate.
- Decreased purchasing power of the poor has made existing saleable reserves unobtainable for many.
- Cessation of large scale emergency relief programs in April 1981.

### 1.4 STRUCTURAL DISRUPTION

An overall view of the evidence suggests that the structural disruption of traditional agricultural and commercial patterns may lead to chronic food shortages for some years to come.

- Resettlement programs are primarily for strategic purposes - their economic viability is not a major consideration. There are severe restrictions on accessibility to land, confusion about land ownership, physical weakness and low morale.
- Price fluctuations and inflation rates, considerably higher than in other parts of Indonesia, together with reduced earning capacity of many, excludes large numbers from the cash market.
- A large decrease in the male population of East Timor has led to the need for a transformation in work patterns that will not occur quickly.
- Control of trading in key cash crops, imposed by the authorities, has seriously decreased traditional commercial exchanges within East Timor.

### 1.5 TIMORESE REACTIONS TO RECENT PRESS REPORTS

- Timorese dismiss reports attributed to ICRC and Whitlam in the Indonesian press (saying there was no famine in East Timor). They suggest that Whitlam in particular would have been taken to specially prepared places as have previous visitors.
- An unsolicited letter from a Timorese in Dili included the following bitter comment:

"They (ICRC and Whitlam/Hastings) are wrong if they conclude from their limited observation that they know the situation in the whole of Timor....reality is turned into unreality and lies are transformed into truth.... The famine is a reality and a very sad truth.... It is sad that the truth is buried."
- Reports of conversations with Timorese regional government leaders meeting in Jakarta during the first two weeks of March indicate that their own assessment runs contrary to the press release statements. They are reported to have said that the situation is very bad and many people are dying but that they have been ordered to say nothing in public about it.

## 2. INTERNATIONAL AID PROGRAMMES

### 2.1 INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS

- The ICRC officer in Jakarta is under instructions not to discuss their program with individuals or private organisations.
- Beyond information available in press reports, we were unable to discover ICRC's future plans in East Timor. ICRC will continue a joint program in East Timor with Indonesian Red Cross. ICRC has no permanent representative in East Timor.
- We propose a series of questions concerning the ICRC Program including:
  - (a) Timorese have reported serious cases of misdirection of ICRC-PMI aid during on-the-ground distribution in East Timor. Does ICRC see this as a problem ?
  - (b) Does ICRC have access to all parts of East Timor ? We note that in its February 1982 survey, only 14 centres were visited.
  - (c) How much notice does ICRC have to give to authorities before travelling to parts of East Timor ?
  - (d) To what extent is ICRC regularly involved in prison visitation, tracing,

family reunion, monitoring of Geneva conventions/ human rights provisions.

## 2.2 CHURCH ORGANISATIONS

### 1. Indonesian Catholic Church

- The Indonesian Catholic Aid agency LPPS channels money from the international Catholic community to the Dili Church for programs including food aid, widow and orphan welfare, small-scale business, health facilities and non-formal education.
- A special channel has been established for assistance to formal and technical school education programs throughout the country.

### 2. Indonesian Council of Churches (DGI)

- DGI funds a small-scale development scheme in Dili and Baucau. It has been invited to begin work in Lospalos. The scheme is called Karya Kasih. Military operations and lack of security for project personnel have restricted Karya Kasih to Dili until early 1982.

## 2.3 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES (CRS)

- CRS's Indonesia director Patrick Johns reported to his head office in New York that he could not confirm "famine" in East Timor. His report and the details of his survey were not available to us.
- CRS operates in East Timor with the Indonesian government. It does not work with the Indonesian or East Timor Catholic Church. The Indonesian government does not permit it to work with the Dili Church. Its projects are funded almost entirely by the U.S. government aid agency (A.I.D.). It is not permitted to have permanent American ground staff in Timor.
- CRS is not involved in emergency relief in East Timor. Its relief program ceased in early 1981. Its project in East Timor is the development of a large-scale rice growing project on the Loes River. There are plans for similar projects on the Laclo and Seical Rivers. Value of total project is estimated at \$5 million.
- The Loes River project is associated with a large resettlement program. Questions have been raised by other aid workers about (1) the cost of project, and (2) where the rice produced on this project will go.

## 2.4. UNICEF

We do not know of any details of this project. We were advised that it may begin in about June 1982.

## 3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Recent Indonesian government publications and press have focused on new economic development in East Timor. In the opinion of East Timorese we interviewed, any development which has occurred is far outweighed by the tragic loss of life and property during that same period and the continuing insecurity of life under the new government.

## IN CAMERA

Their experience colours their attitude to new economic developments but they do point to deficiencies in economic programs. Timorese argue that living standards are much lower than in pre-invasion times; many are disadvantaged by changes in economy and the heavy emphasis on a cash economy.

### 3.1 COFFEE INDUSTRY

- Coffee is presently the major cash crop of East Timor.
- All trade in coffee is controlled by one company P.T. Denok (connected to army).
- Sale of coffee for private or commercial purposes is forbidden.
- Coffee tax collected by provincial government is a source of conflict between military and the Governor.
- Good quality coffee is all exported; only impure coffee is available in Dili at high prices.

### 3.2 FOOD PRICES

- Food price fluctuations make it difficult for most Timorese to buy food.
- Nine major commodities subject to price stabilisation in Indonesia fluctuate wildly in East Timor.
- Rice prices: Rp 20,000 in Dili - 35,000 in the provinces (equivalent quality rice in Jakarta cost Rp 10,000 / 50 kg sack).
- Rice is almost always sold in large quantities.
- Meat prices are beyond most people.

### 3.3 RESETTLEMENT CENTRES

- Housing has been built - but is of poor quality.
- Access to adequate agricultural land is restricted by "surat jalans" security requirements.
- There is lack of morale and dependence on outside aid.

### 3.4 HEALTH

- Central control of medical distribution in the hands of two doctors who take ICRC and Government medical supplies for own personal commercial interests.
- Special concessions attract newly graduate doctors for one year who use devious means to fulfill their obligation with minimal service time in Dili and less in the districts.
- Hospitals are often avoided by East Timorese because of experiences of mismanagement, neglect and absence of medical treatment.
- Outbreaks of cholera were reported to us. TB is said to be on the increase, especially since 1979. Gastro-enteritis symptoms are reportedly widespread.
- Essential medicals are not available, it is claimed, and the sale of available medicines is a source of private profit manipulated by doctors and military - especially in isolated areas.

### 3.5 BUSINESS/JOBS

- P.T. Denok controls all import/export contracts for most essential commodities. It is claimed that jobs are given to Indonesians in preference to Timorese (e.g. nurses).

- No jobs are available for relatives of Fretilin, or for those who do not take Indonesian citizenship.

### 3.6 PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET

- Questions are asked about misuse of funds (e.g. Comoro River bridge, a large budget allotment and opened by the President but in fact an old Portuguese bridge repainted by Indonesians.

### 3.7 TIMORESE ATTITUDES TO DEVELOPMENT

- Some Timorese claim that living standards are lower now than before the Indonesian takeover. The opinion "self-determination is more important than new buildings" expresses a sentiment common to most of the people we interviewed. Timorese react to their increased marginalisation in the operation of their own economy. They also deplore the massive depletion of economic resources, coffee, sandalwood, livestock...

## 4. HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR

Evidence suggests a continuing denial of basic freedoms in East Timor and gross violations of human rights. It suggests widespread recent violations continuing a pattern of earlier years. We have been provided with material in the following areas:

### 4.1 POLITICAL PRISONS

- Atauro island: families of Resistance members are held there as well as political prisoners. The island has been used for this purpose since mid-1980. In November 1981 about 4,000 prisoners were living in extremely poor conditions. Many deaths have occurred. ICRC visited in February 1982 and registered names of detainees.
- Economic consequences for the families of prisoners lead to prostitution, agreeing to spy for the army etc.

### 4.2. TORTURE

- We received the letter of a person tortured in Liquica in early 1981.
- An interpreter for the Indonesian army during torture sessions has given extensive testimony.
- Methods used include electricity, beatings, burning with cigarettes, threatened rape.

### 4.3. ATROCITIES

Evidence includes accounts of the following incidents:

- Multiple killings in Lacluta in 1981.
- Killing of women and children during Operasi Keamanan - 1981.
- Two people beaten to death in Baucau market place.

4.4 EXECUTIONS/DISAPPEARANCES

Evidence includes accounts of the following incidents:

- Execution of people after surrender and torture.
- Shooting of ex-Fretelin person during Operasi Keamanan.
- "Disappearance" of political prisoners.

4.5 SEXUAL ABUSE

Evidence includes accounts of the following incidents:

- Women obliged to sleep with Indonesian soldiers (e.g. Lahane, mid 1981).
- Rape and bizarre sexual abuse of male and female prisoners.

4.6 MILITARY OPERATIONS

We heard details of mistreatment of population during 1981 Operasi Keamanan (lack of food, harsh conditions, obligation to participate, killing of people captured). Informants had a variety of explanations for continued military presence and operations including:

- (a) An attempt to destroy the resistance;
- (b) The Indonesian army, or sections of it, is politically and/or economically advantaged by maintaining a situation of disorder in Timor.

4.7 FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT/COMMUNICATION

- Mail is censored, between government officials, addressed to Peoples Representative Council and in and out of the country.
- A permit or "surat jalan" is required for movement anywhere in East Timor, even for going to the fields.
- East Timorese living in or visiting Indonesia are afraid to take any initiatives lest it be considered as evidence of support for the resistance.

4.8 CONSCRIPTION

- Forced participation in Hansip ("home guard").
- Forced participation in Operasi Keamanan - 1981.

5. TIMORESE REACTIONS TO THE INTEGRATION EXPERIENCE

Our evidence leads us to believe that the process of forced integration is a fundamental disruption of East Timorese society. This has led to a variety of reactions amongst the East Timorese. Conditions in the territory have created fear, uncertainty for the future and deep distrust, even amongst family members. Some describe, in themselves, a loss of cultural identity. Even those who have participated in the formal structures of integration show signs of disaffection. Resistance to integration manifests itself in different ways. Informed Indonesians say that many East Timorese do not accept the integration of their country into Indonesia, even though they may judge this attitude unrealistic.

5.1 RESISTANCE TO INTEGRATION

1. Armed Resistance

- Estimates of size and degree of organisation indicate guerilla tactics will continue especially in the Eastern districts.
- Passive/active support of the resistance by the population.

2. Non-cooperation with Government programs

- Preference of population for non-government schools
- Reluctance to accept government money for orphan projects.
- Suspensions experienced by aid workers receiving government support.

3. Refusal to take citizenship

- As an expression of non-acceptance of integration.
- As a means of providing a lever in international moves to allow those people to leave East Timor.

4. The position of the Church in Timor

- Opposition to ecclesiastical integration into Indonesia.
- Its standing among East Timorese as compared to support for the army or civil authorities.

5. Expressions of desire for self-determination

These take many forms and suggest different strategies but they indicate widespread opposition to integration. some examples:

- i. "We are in a process of evolution and the end of the process is to achieve freedom - to have the ability to decide for yourself as a person who is free and created by God."
- ii. "Fretilin represents the aspiration of the East Timorese people. The legitimacy of the Fretilin position is becoming clearer because of the crimes of the Indonesian army."
- iii. One source told a story of the arrival of international aid agency personnel. As the helicopter landed an elder rushed up and kneeling down pleaded for help and thanked them for coming. But he and all the people later felt very disappointed when they discovered the white man had come to bring them only food, not freedom. The people can suffer empty stomachs, he said, but they were hoping for someone to help them gain freedom.

6. Many people desire to leave East Timor.

5.2 DISAFFECTION AMONG SUPPORTERS OF INTEGRATION

We have information and documents containing important evidence on this topic. Subject matter includes:

1. The 1980 Liquica-Bazartete 'rebellion' plan.
2. The 1981 Dili DPR document.
3. Views of regional Government heads.
4. Position of the Governor and Vice-Governor.
5. Non-cooperation of former UDT and Apodeti members.

5.3 FEAR AND DISTRUST

- For economic survival some people inform on friends.
- Movement between areas is sometimes construed as indicating sympathy for Fretilin.
- There is a 'black list' of 'suspects' who are regularly harrassed or interrogated..
- Old political divisions are still a cause of conflict.

5.4 LOSS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY

- Tetum and other local languages not permitted in government schools and discouraged elsewhere.
- People feel that there is disregard for historical values and traditions.
- Indonesian "Pancasila" doctrine is thrust upon them and does not comply with practice of Indonesian presence.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

6.1 POPULATION

- Some Timorese believe that systematic genocide is occurring in East Timor. Informants gave examples of population losses in specific districts.
- There are some suggestions that the 1980 Indonesian census may overstate the population of East Timor.

6.2 FAMILY REUNION

We have information on the following subjects:

- Surat Jalan from East Timor - costs and limitations.
- Exit permits from Indonesia - costs/ availability.
- Numbers of East Timorese currently in Jakarta.
- Numbers wishing to leave East Timor.
- Fate of 32 arrested in Jakarta, November 1981.
- Illegal methods of leaving East Timor.

6.3 VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE OF EAST TIMOR

7. THE CHURCH

The evidence we have collected suggests that both the people and the military consider the Church to play a key role in the future of East Timor. There are differences over particular issues, policies and tactics but general agreement about the importance of the Church as a source of humanitarian assistance, as a voice of the people and as an expression of the people's aspirations.

Subjects covered in interviews include:

## **IN CAMERA**

- the position of the Vatican Pro Nuncio in Jakarta;
- the role and function of the Apostolic Administrator in Dili;
- the interaction, cooperation and conflict, between priests and other Church personnel;
- attitudes of people to the clergy;
- interactions, cooperation and conflict, between Church personnel and military and civil personnel at the district level, at the territorial level, at the territorial level and at the Indonesian national level;
- the role of the Church in humanitarian aid, education, health and territorial level and at the Indonesian national level;
- the role of the Church in humanitarian aid, education, health and development programs.

In these matters it is essential that the strictest confidentiality be established in relation to evidence.

CHAIRMAN - Gentlemen, I now invite you to speak to the document circulated to the Committee and at the conclusion of your remarks I shall invite members of the Committee to direct questions to you.

Mr Waddingham - I will make a couple of introductory comments before speaking to our submission. We went to Indonesia for two weeks in March this year specifically to collect as much recent information as we could on the present situation in East Timor. They were a fairly intensive two weeks and it is a rather daunting task for us to attempt in the space of something like an hour or an hour and a half, I feel, to do justice to all that we have collected.

Senator MacGIBBON - How was the tour organised? Did you nominate where you wanted to go or were you permitted to go to these areas?

Mr Waddingham - We were in Indonesia - in Jakarta and Jogjakarta. Is that what you mean?

Senator MacGIBBON - Did you nominate the points to which you were going or did the Indonesians nominate them?

Mr Waddingham - We nominated them.

Senator MacGIBBON - There was no restraint on where you went, to the best of your knowledge?

Mr Waddingham - No. It is impossible to relate to you all the detail of what we learnt. We had hoped to be able before now to present even more material collected by us but the truth is

that we simply have not been able to do it. We have only just in the last couple of days finally pulled together all material that includes, in particular, records of interview with some 25 people in Indonesia. Would the Committee be interested in having copies of those records of interview? I do not have multiple copies here and there is obviously no way we can address them in detail here but would the Committee see any value in having a copy of our records of interview?

Senator PRIMMER - I cannot see why not. It is another angle.

CHAIRMAN - It could be added information but perhaps you will cover those interviews, in some brevity no doubt but in some detail.

Mr Waddingham - We certainly will be covering those.

CHAIRMAN - Perhaps you will also highlight the things that you feel are important. I think that is important to us.

Mr Waddingham - Yes. I have one set of other material which we collected in Indonesia and I will pass it on to you now. We have asked for an in camera session, in my case not to protect myself - I would be quite happy for this stuff to be on the public record - and Father Dureau can speak for himself in terms of why he wanted an in camera session. The main reason is not to protect ourselves but to protect the people to whom we spoke. Any public association of ourselves with the data that we collected would make it fairly easy for people concerned with the issue in Jakarta itself to determine who our informants were.

That is why we have sought this in camera session. As the Committee knows, I have in another way asked questions about the issue of confidentiality. Without wanting to consume much time - in fact I would like not to consume any time on it at all - I am wondering about the problem we have of whether we should name individuals to whom we spoke. The Timorese to whom we spoke are in a very vulnerable position. They are not Timorese who are seeking to leave the country but rather those who want to stay in East Timor. They were very reluctant to speak to us and spoke to us under strict conditions of confidentiality. Certain Indonesians to whom we spoke are also in a very vulnerable position; some to whom we spoke are even under suspicion of having released information about the internal situation in East Timor. So my question is this: Are names necessary for the record? If not, could we describe the witnesses in general terms? If there comes a time when the Committee would like to verify the existence of one or other of those people or is in a position to talk to one or other of those people then we would be approachable for their names. Could we have some guidance on that?

Senator HAMER - It seems to me that if we are going to receive what is necessarily secondhand evidence, reports of conversations, it makes no difference whatever to their credibility to have the name. As we will not be cross-examining the person directly, there is no benefit in having the name if it would cause embarrassment.

CHAIRMAN - I agree with that. That is what I was about to say. I do not think there is any necessity for that. An identification as to their nationality, Indonesian or Timorese, would be sufficient at this point.

Father Dureau - Let me state my background and the basis on which I speak. I have been in Indonesia, working as a missionary, for over nine years and I am now in Australia for three or four years to further my research studies and so on. One of the reasons why I prefer to give evidence in camera, apart from the protection of the names of the people concerned which Mr Waddingham has just mentioned, is that I speak in the name of those people in Indonesia, as well as those in Timor, who are really concerned about the situation in Timor but who are unable to voice their criticism because of the nature of the situation in Indonesia. That also applies to me, because I am very vulnerable, in the sense that, if the Indonesian Government were to know of my concern and my public interest in this area of Timor, definitely they would be able to exclude the possibility

of my further work in Indonesia which I intend to make my life's work.

Senator MacGIBBON - You live permanently in Indonesia?

Father Dureau - Yes.

Mr Waddingham - I was going to make a brief comment about the nature of the interviews. We talked to Indonesians and East Timorese. Most of the interviews were conducted in the Indonesian language, in which Father Dureau is very fluent. We were able to meet in conditions of absolute privacy. We had conversations, generally of about three hours, with people and in about three or four cases we had a total time of some 10 hours with some people. The Timorese, as I have already mentioned, were broadly on training courses in Indonesia. They are not Timorese seeking to leave the country. I think that is an important point. They are people who see themselves as Timorese and who want to stay in their country. Amongst the Indonesians there were different sorts of people, but probably one of the most important groups was a group of Indonesians who visit East Timor regularly, who had been to Timor up until the very day we arrived in Indonesia. We can perhaps refer to their specific information as we go. The strength of the material, I think, is that it is recent material. Almost all that we have gathered concerns the last 12 months in East Timor. That is as recent as one can get.

It is our intention here to talk about three main areas, to shortcut the information. We will give an account of the overriding concerns of East Timorese as we saw them, share with you pieces of new information that we collected, and then also offer the information that we believe confirms that what Timorese have claimed about East Timor in the past is in many cases still happening in East Timor; it is not simply a matter of the past. Our aim here is, as much as possible, not to present our own opinions and overviews but to try to make available to the Committee information which would not ordinarily be available. Rather than speaking at length, we would welcome the idea of questions as we go.

Father Dureau - As you know, as Mr Waddingham said, we spoke to something like 35 to 40 people in Indonesia, about 25 of whom were Timorese. We also collected a large wad of material written by Timorese in Timor for a variety of reasons but circulated beyond Timor, brought out of Timor. We received it, translated it and brought it here. In all of that material and in all of the interviews, here are some of the things that they say to us spontaneously when we ask: 'Can you tell us a bit about the situation of Timor today?' The first and predominant thing they mention is the climate of fear, a sense of being alien or of being totally lost and out of control and out of possession of anything that they used to own and have belonging to them. For instance, many of them spoke about the lack of habeas corpus, the

possibility of imprisonment at any minute. Somebody might walk in the back door or the front door and say 'You are under arrest', and the rest of the family might not know how long they are going to be away. It might be three hours, it might be a night, it might be five days; they might not come back again. They are often moved into resettlement camps that they have put around everywhere. In those resettlement camps although, through a lot of administrative difficulty, they may be able to move to their fields - they get permission from various government and military officials to move out of these resettlement camps even to go to their fields - the sense of fear that, if they go, something might happen to them or they might be identified as belonging to the enemy, is constantly with them. So their only response is to stop, to do nothing, to say nothing, to speak nothing, not even to speak to their own family. There is this constant threat of their property - a lot of them had their property destroyed and taken from them, their houses burned - and again the threat of association with Fretilin.

One Indonesian soldier said, and it was reported to us, that the problem that we have today is that all the other Indonesian soldiers have taken everything and we are left with nothing. Another big problem that the people have there is the misappropriation of aid; aid they know is coming to them, often they see foreign personnel but they do not know why these personnel are there because quite frequently either the type of aid they have or the amount of aid they have is well below what is sent to them. Many of them we spoke to have some direct association with the aid distribution - one was a truck driver of one of the aid distribution trucks, one was a Catholic Relief Services personnel, and several others like that. They all identified that a large proportion of the aid was not getting to the people that most needed it. Some said 30 per cent, some said 75 per cent, some said 50 per cent. We cannot verify, but the fact that they said it is important.

Another thing that they often mention is genocide. Genocide is their word, not ours, and it is a common word that they use. They feel that it is the policy of the Indonesian occupation to destroy the population, and they do this in two ways - they think that it is better to get rid of the person than to have the problem going on. This is the Timorese expression of it. They say often if there is a problem it is better to kill the person. That is the way they understand the Indonesian wisdom. Genocide is also in their mass killings, mass destructions, bombings and

so on. Another area that they isolate is the area of the economy. They feel marginalised and with an increasing lack of control of their own economy where previously their economy was but an occasion to live out their lives. They isolate things like the monopoly by P.T. Denok of the coffee trade particularly. They also speak of the exclusion of the lower classes from the possibility of buying basic necessities. They say there is food sometimes in some of the major cities but because of the situation that has been introduced by the Indonesians they are now excluded from the possibility of obtaining this food. Then a number of them identify also the poor quality of the Indonesian development projects. Many people have referred to the fact of the success of the Indonesian occupation by referring to either houses being built or roads being built. The Timorese themselves say: 'Don't identify with this. Don't see this.' When we asked them about it they said: 'It is such a poor quality. It has nothing by comparison with what we knew under the Portuguese time.'

Another area that they often identify with is injustice in regard to enforcement of law. They isolate cases of people who are either murdered or mistreated or even small things like houses being misappropriated or land misappropriated. In the case of the Timorese there does not seem to be any justice. In the case of the Indonesian occupying forces there seems to be immediate justice put in and we can give plenty of examples of

this. For instance, in one area the Government came in and asked for people to write down all the things that they had lost in one plunder of one of the occupying commands. So they wrote down all the things that they had lost. The central Government of Indonesia reimbursed a lot of these losses but the money did not get to the people; it stayed with the military, the occupying military force, and in that case also some top level Timorese officials were also included. There were other cases where houses were burnt down or where people were murdered. Several top level Timorese tried to intervene so that some sort of justice was seen to be taking place in regard to the murders of Timorese. But in every case that they identified there was a great imbalance of injustice.

Another area that they identify with spontaneously is the Church as their source of help, some say their only source of help, some say our last strength, and so on. In other words, they identify that institution called the Church as the one that they would like most, or they feel is most able to help them at this moment, at this time in their history. Another area that has shocked them greatly has been what is called the Operasi Keamanan which went for June to October last year and was, so far anyway, the final operation of the Indonesian occupying forces to get rid of the Fretilin. They felt that this was a great disgrace to the people because the people themselves in the villages were forced to go out and stand between the Fretilin

army and the Indonesian army as a shield for the Indonesians. The documents that we have describe that the only thing the Fretilin or the resistance forces could do was to throw down their arms. They were unable and unprepared to kill their own fellow countrymen.

The people, themselves, felt that this was a forced thing; they were without food, without clothing, without shelter. Many of them died on the way. It was not only just that but it was the whole fact of having been forced by the Indonesians to stand before the Indonesian guns and in front of their own brothers, the Fretilin guns.

Another area about which they are very unhappy is resettlement. They feel that the Timorese cannot live in their own land as they used to. They ask why it is that they have to be resettled and they have to be moved. For example, after June 1980 there was an attack on the outskirts of Dili. According to the report we received all those people on the outskirts were taken and put into Dili town and all their houses were burnt. Many of them were interrogated. Many of them were left there for a long time before new shanty-type houses were built for them on the airport and surrounding areas. They see this again as a sort of a whole sense of alienation. They are some of the areas that they immediately associate with. The principle underlying all this is an extraordinary sense of self-determination. One would think that the people we interviewed - people who had worked with the Indonesian Government, people who had worked as government officials, students who were studying in Jogjakarta and in Indonesia for work in the government service and in the welfare of Timor and church people consistently said that despite all their

involvements with the Indonesians they were still for self-determination. That was their main aim - independence for their country or some form of expression of how they could control their own future.

That self-determination varied from person to person. Some said that it meant some form of plebiscite and that it did not necessarily mean that right then they were not going to be associated with the Indonesians et cetera. But all of them said that they had not had the chance to say what they wanted about their country. In regard to this they said that they felt totally isolated and increasingly isolated from the international community and yet they felt that their only support will come from the international community. Often many of them, despite apparent fear, and also the amazing risk that they put themselves to, came to us and said: 'We realise all that'. Often it would take a good 10 or 15 minutes to establish my credentials and credibility. Then they would say: 'All right. I will tell you'. It would be these sorts of things. Despite this great fear they feel they do want the international community to know what is going on. These are the some of the major concerns of the Timorese in general.

Senator HAMER - What are the Timorese whom you met in Java doing there? What sort of Timorese were they and why were they in Java?

Father Dureau - Apart from the rare exception, almost all of

them - that is, about 75 per cent or more - were there to study for two or three or four years with the idea of going back to Timor.

Senator HAMER - Were they at universities or school or what?

Father Dureau - They were undertaking university studies, technical studies or church studies.

Senator HAMER - Would they have been able to have that type of study before the Indonesian occupation?

Father Dureau - Yes, some of them would have gone to Portugal and that sort of thing.

Senator HAMER - The educational opportunities when it was under Portugal were, as I read the state of the country, extremely limited.

Father Dureau - It was much slower in the sense that the possibilities of education for people, as I understand it, during the Portuguese time - and the need for and the possibilities for education - were lower because having to go to Portugal was much further than going to Indonesia. The fact that they had to go out of their country in both cases remains the same.

Senator HAMER - From the Indonesian point of view, the people are not going out of their country - they are going to a different part of it. But that is a matter of semantics.

Mr Waddingham - Except that I think what we are attempting to do here is to reflect as well as we can the feelings of Timorese about the situation.

Senator HAMER - What I am trying to establish is what sort of sample they were of Timorese feelings. These people would be Indonesian speaking, presumably, because academic courses are only held in Indonesian rather than Javanese.

Father Dureau - They speak Indonesian - yes. They do not speak Javanese.

Senator MacGIBBON - Just following on that point, how would you identify Timorese in Jakarta or any of these places?

Father Dureau - Do you mean if I were not to ask them firstly?

Senator MacGIBBON - In any way.

Father Dureau - Firstly, I would ask them. They would identify themselves as to what country they came from. I would know whether they were Timorese also because their appearance is quite different from that of people from other parts of Indonesia, except the islands surrounding Timor. I ought to be able to identify them as west Timorese, Floranise, Sumbanese or Timorese.

Senator MacGIBBON - You spent some time in Jakarta, did you not?

Father Dureau - In Indonesia.

Senator MacGIBBON - Is there an emigre group of Papua New Guinea people in Jakarta? I mean are people who are unhappy about the form of government in New Guinea living in Jakarta? Are you aware of that?

Father Dureau - Personally, the Papua New Guineans and Indonesians I have met who are in Java for study seem quite proud about a lot of things there.

Senator MacGIBBON - Did you identify a group of New Guineans anywhere in Indonesia who were opposed to the political forms of the present Government in New Guinea?

Father Dureau - Yes.

Senator HAMER - I am sorry if I seem persistent on this but what we have to establish as far as we can is the situation in East Timor and the views of the East Timorese. I am interested, therefore, in what type of people you were talking to and in how they were selected. Were they self-selected? Did the word get around, in effect, that you were here to collect complaints about East Timor and that those who had complaints were to please come along? Were there a large number of people who were perfectly happy and did not come to you? Would you comment on that possibility?

Father Dureau - In some cases we would ask one person to ask a number of people whose names we already had to come to us.

Senator HAMER - Were these the names of people who were studying in Jakarta or people who were known to be critical of the situation in East Timor?

Father Dureau - They are not necessarily the same.

Senator HAMER - They could be the same; they could be different.

Father Dureau - In some cases we had one or two names of people we wanted to contact. We contacted those people and they acted as contacts for others. In some cases people came to us spontaneously. They heard that we were there and came to us. In another case I went to one of the places where a lot of Timorese people were living and spoke to a number of them there, then a number of them came to me later on and spoke to me in private.

Senator HAMER - In your opinion were the people who were giving these views balanced? Were they able to say that they had lost their political freedom and that sort of thing but that on the other hand they had educational opportunities that they would not have had under the Portuguese regime? Did they give an impression of balance or was everything bad?

Mr Waddingham - I would certainly like to make a comment on that. What Father Dureau has described in terms of overriding concerns gives the impression that in fact they are saying that everything is bad. Timorese speak about those things which concern them most. I am sure that some Timorese have had opportunities, say educationally, that they may not have had before 1975. We do not know what would have happened after 1975 had Indonesia not gone in there. I will cite a few of my own credentials. I have been following these Timorese people very closely for some seven years now and the reason, I think, why Timorese say these things is because they are the dominant feelings they have. Houses may be built in the resettlement

sites but this is not sufficient for them to accept what is happening in East Timor. If you asked the Timorese whether they would have been able to this in 1975 the answer would probably have been no. But that still does not wipe out the other things that have happened in East Timor. That is not to justify. It is just to explain why these sorts of things are said.

Senator HAMER - I was merely seeking, insofar as we can, to establish their objectivity.

Mr Waddingham - Objectivity is a problem. Have you had a chance to look at some of those documents? I was struck by the deep emotion in many of the documents. They are not clinical, objectively distant documents. They are documents written in a difficult situation and they reflect the feelings of people. So one is hard pressed to find from the Timorese very cold, dispassionate accounts.

Senator HAMER - The sort of problem we run into is that what they suggest should be done is clearly quite impractical. For example, the restoration of Portuguese colonial rule was raised yesterday and then a transition to independence. There is no conceivable way, in my view, that that could happen and some of them do not seem to have much concept of what is and is not possible.

Mr Waddingham - I disagree on that. The first task for this Committee has always been to determine as well as it can what is happening on the ground in East Timor.

Senator HAMER - I accept that but we are using secondhand witnesses and we have to look at whether or not they are reasonably credible.

Mr Waddingham - I should say that it is not just Timorese to whom we spoke. There are some very well placed Indonesians who would say the same as the Timorese are saying.

Senator BOLKUS - Among the people you were talking to was there any indication of nationality, of whether they had taken up Indonesian citizenship?

Father Dureau - No. As far as I can remember I do not think I had any indication that they had taken up Indonesian citizenship.

Mr Waddingham - That was not the major topic of conversation. I am just trying to think about the Timorese we spoke to. I cannot remember our addressing the question so I cannot offer any specific data.

CHAIRMAN - They would need Indonesian citizenship even to vote, would they not?

Father Dureau - No. The Timorese Government requests that they take up Indonesian citizenship and, as some people have mentioned, there seems to be no other option. But, possibly, because they are at present outside the country, they may not have felt this pressure. I do not know. It was not something that a number of them mentioned.

Mr Waddingham - We did hear that from people who were trying to leave Indonesia. In the main those who are trying to leave have not taken Indonesian citizenship. As one person put it to me, it is a lever with which to get some international recognition but if they say they are Indonesian citizens then it is very difficult to get out. I suspect, but I do not know, that a number of Timorese in Jakarta on courses have taken citizenship, but really I do not know the answer to that.

Senator HAMER - Do you know what rules are applied to the taking out of Indonesian citizenship by Timorese? We heard suggestions yesterday that if you wanted to continue your employment in the Public Service you had to do so although someone appeared to work for three or four years in the Public Service without taking it. Do you have evidence on that? What are the rules about Indonesian citizenship and how firmly are they enforced?

Mr Waddingham - I have no evidence.

Senator MacGIBBON - I am not supporting the Indonesian case at all but just looking at it dispassionately and being the devil's advocate on this. How much different in reality is life in Timor today from what it was 10 or 20 years ago? You had a regime there that ran for over 400 years. By all accounts it was not a citadel of life, liberty and equality but people got used to those pressures over many, many generations. Maybe all the things you have mentioned today - fear about property,

misappropriation of aid, genocide, lack of control of the economy and the poor quality of Indonesian products - went on before in some way. Aid is not always administered with fairness around the world. In undeveloped countries it very rarely reaches the targets that it sets out to reach. Regarding genocide, without supporting it at all I could take you into many cities in the United States where people will murder you for 50c, rather than leave you bleeding or bruised in the gutter. On the road building, apparently there were very few sealed roads there at all before; there are some sealed roads now in Timor. How much is it a different authority as opposed to a change in the standard of living or the human liberties in all those things that are going on?

Father Dureau - I am aware that hardly anything happened in Portuguese times but the overriding impression I got from speaking to those people was that they felt that there was enormous difference between now and then. The difference lay not so much in more houses or more schools but in the fact that they were able to cope, and cope quite comfortably, during the Portuguese time. Things made sense and basically their cultural and social mores were kept intact. Now nothing seems to make sense and they cannot cope with the sorts of things that are happening to them. For instance, they were able to buy meat, vegetables and rice or corn or whatever it was that they needed, apparently quite comfortably. Those who wanted to trade were

able to trade and the price of their coffee was proportionate to the amount of work that they did and so on. Now everything is out of control and much worse for them, in those terms, than it was before. That is the way they put it.

Senator MacGIBBON - What I am driving at is the situation now, seven years after the Indonesians have gone on. It seems to be the same sort of thing that occurred 400 years ago when the Portuguese moved in and disrupted the whole cultural scene that existed at that time. It is impossible to answer such a question, I suppose.

Mr Waddingham - It is certainly impossible within the terms of our collection of material. I would offer some comments but I feel we are going to run out of time to deliver the data we have here.

Senator MacGIBBON - You said that the central government in Indonesia made restitution for stolen property but that did not reach the Timorese it was intended to reimburse. Did you say that some of that was due to corruption in the Timorese themselves as opposed to the lower levels of the Indonesian army?

Father Dureau - I did. This is part of a document that we have that is fairly important, and Mr Waddingham will speak to it.

CHAIRMAN - I think that more or less what Senator MacGibbon has been asking is this: Could it be that at least some of the trauma that is found in Timor today is associated with the fact

that it is a transition period on top of what probably occurred some hundreds of years ago? This is another transition and perhaps some of the problems, at least, are relative to that. It is understandable how hard any transition is. One wonders whether beyond the transition period, unfortunate though it may be, perhaps a greater level of affluence and a greater comfort may ultimately accrue to the people.

Mr Waddingham - It may be the case but I think it is a theoretical position at this time. It is true, one hopes, that what Timorese claim has happened in the last five years will not be forever continuing. Certainly the Timorese would hope that. Nonetheless, I think that what we are reflecting is what Timorese are claiming is going on now and if I can bring my own opinion into it, their justifiable reaction to it. But in terms of the future that is another question.

CHAIRMAN - I am not supporting it in any way at all; I am just trying to look at it as an outsider.

Father Dureau - These are questions we asked ourselves in trying to get information from them.

Mr Waddingham - One often hears references to the Portuguese times when things were better. If you question Timorese closely you find that they are not necessarily saying it was perfect but they are offering it as a sort of reference point - in some cases, anyway. Some people do; they would prefer the Portuguese to come back.

CHAIRMAN - Quite obviously they would.

Mr Waddingham - Often it is used not as a plea for the good times of the Portuguese but rather by way of comparison.

Senator HAMER - I do not suppose by their nature they would be likely to be doing educational courses in Java. I understand there has been an attempt to improve agricultural methods by stopping the old slash and burn system of agriculture and trying to get them onto some form of cash cropping presumably in the lowland areas rather than the uplands. Did you get any comments on that? That is normally a very necessary process but in every country in which it is tried it is strongly resented by the people to whom it is supplied even though it is in their interest. The Chairman will remember the reports we had in Thailand on exactly the same problem. It was obviously essential that this should be done but it was resisted by the people and regarded as very unfair and undesirable even though it was in their interest. Did you get any impression of attempts to improve the pattern of agriculture in Timor and what the reaction of the subsistence farmers were to it?

Mr Waddingham - What you are raising, though I would raise it in a different way, is probably one of the central issues in Timor today and that is the Indonesian Government's resettlement policy. I hope to be addressing it in some detail this afternoon.

Senator HAMER - I could defer my question and raise it then, if that would help.

Mr Waddingham - We will be mentioning it anyway in terms of the impact of that resettlement policy on food production.

CHAIRMAN - In a sentence, what do you do and what is your association with the whole business?

Mr Waddingham - I am a private citizen. I am not formally associated with any of the aid agencies under whose auspices I went to Indonesia. I have worked since 1975 producing, in part anyway, a small publication called 'Timor Information Service' and establishing a detailed file on East Timor since then. That is my work in a sense though I have to work part time to live. I do not know what else I can tell you. I followed it very closely for some years now, arising out of a general interest in Indonesia but moving on to Timor as I came to know Timorese.

CHAIRMAN - How was it, I wonder, that you did not observe the conditions of the Timorese prior to that seven-year period? The latter stages of that period were preparatory to civil war and all sorts of disorder and ultimately the establishment of a government under Fretilin which lasted for about three months. They were days of a subsistence economy and of some measure of disaster in the fields of health. Economic development was virtually unknown. They were indeed the last days of a colonialism which did not compare very favourably with other areas of colonialism. Were you concerned at that situation? Were you concerned with the problems of those days?

Mr Waddingham - Timor was virtually unknown to us as it was to most Australians. Australians fought there in World War II, and there was the occasional tourist but Timor was not known. I

was in Indonesia and my interest arose because I was in Indonesia at the very time the issue first came up in 1974. Jose Ramos Horta from Fretilin visited Jakarta in June 1974. I arrived back in Jakarta from East Indonesia a couple of days after Gough Whitlam had made his first visit there and discussed the issue. So I did not know about Timor until that time when it was put quite firmly in front of me. Many others learned about it only at that time. What I would like to do quite quickly now - we can go into the detail if time permits - is to offer some new pieces of information which are relevant to material that has probably already been received by the Committee. I have a few points about the food situation. It has been the major issue of contention this year, starting it seems from one letter from the head of the Church in Dili. I hope in due course the Committee will see that letter. You will be very surprised to find that the letter says very much less than it has alleged to have said vis-a-vis food. It is for Australian Catholic Relief which owns the letter to table it with the Committee. Whatever the letter said the fact is there has been quite some debate about whether there is a famine in East Timor.

Senator MacGIBBON - Have you been over all of Timor?

Mr Waddingham - I have never been to Timor.

Senator MacGIBBON - I just wanted to know what it would be like agriculturally. I flew over there a year or two ago. I was on the flight deck and it looked a pretty dry sort of place. It

was not the lush tropical country that I thought it would be. I just wanted to get a feel for how much good arable land existed there.

Mr Waddingham - May I suggest that I would be prepared to talk about that to the extent that I can this afternoon? We arrived in Jakarta at the very time that International Red Cross gave a Press conference following its 12-day visit to East Timor. A couple of days before, Gough Whitlam's headlines in Jakarta were 'No Famine in Timor'. The Indonesian paper reports of both the International Red Cross conference and the Whitlam conference were that there was no famine in East Timor. We did manage to have a telephone conversation with the regional representative of International Red Cross. He said that the newspaper articles did not reflect accurately their intention in their Press conference. I think we can quote the words exactly from David Delapraz:

What we have said about East Timor is not a general statement; it is valid only for the places we visited and only for the time we were there.

International Red Cross visited some 18 places, 14 of which were places in which International Red Cross had maintained or had had a program operating since late 1979. So my immediate reaction was that it was not surprising that one would not find famine in areas in which International Red Cross had already been working for some two years.

In terms of hard data about the food situation in East Timor, many Timorese of course say that what has been said is a lie, that it is not true, and that there are food shortages. But in terms of detail on the actual situation the best we could come up with was an assessment by the East Timor Church which had been passed on to an Indonesian Catholic aid agency. Copies of that document are already in the senators' hands. It is a signed document 6 in the collection of material, so I will not go into that in detail at this stage. It basically said that there were some 236,000 East Timorese, particularly in the eastern part of East Timor, facing some food shortages, some 80,000 of whom were facing potential severe food shortage. They ascribe the immediate cause of these food shortages to the fact that war has caused a lack of ordinary reserves; Timorese have a lower purchasing power; cessation of the major aid programs in April 1981; the military operations last year and the resettlement program.

The resettlement program, we will just mention here it is suggested, is still a major structural reason for food shortage in East Timor. Whether or not its intentions were to improve agriculture, the story at present is that the resettlement site effectively means restricted access to arable land and hence an inbuilt food shortage in East Timor. Other structural reasons for food shortages or claimed food shortages are that food prices are apparently out of the reach of most Timorese. Father Dureau

could tell us more about this, but I understand that in Indonesia there are nine basic food and household items which have price controls in Indonesia. Those price controls do not operate in East Timor, and the prices by and large are of the order of double the prices in Indonesia.

Senator HAMER - Is this information from the ICRC?

Mr Waddingham - No, I am sorry. The only bit of information from ICRC is that qualification. This in broad terms is a summation really of material but I am drawing mainly from - perhaps Father Dureau could specify to the extent we can - Indonesian people who are in direct contact with East Timor, who visit there regularly and who are involved in aid programs by the East Timor Church.

Senator HAMER - Where would that figure of 80,000 facing severe food shortage or possible famine come from?

Mr Waddingham - That comes essentially from East Timorese clergy in those parts of East Timor.

Senator HAMER - Are they the ones to whom you spoke in Darwin?

Mr Waddingham - No. We have received a summation of those people's collection of material in East Timor.

Father Dureau - From an Indonesian working. There is a team of Indonesians that liaises between the Indonesian Church and the Timorese people via the Church channels in Timor. This liaison body goes there every three months. We spoke to them quite

extensively and we arrived in Jakarta with them on the same plane. They got on at Bali and we spent several days with them going over their information. Part of this information was this assessment of the food situation that they brought from a meeting that they had with representatives from the various regions in Dili. Representatives of the various regions had made a broad assessment of this food situation, which was not an official or in any sense a scientific survey but a general outline of each region. Then a conclusion to that would have been that at least 85,000 people were facing serious food shortages.

Mr Waddingham - Not necessarily at that time, by the way, but they would be facing it in the next few months.

CHAIRMAN - Were they representatives of the Church in those various regions? You said that it was done through Church channels. I presume you are referring to the assessment made by members of the Church in the various regions. Is that right?

Father Dureau - Yes.

Senator HAMER - Sorry to go on about this but you understand the significance of these sorts of things. What did the people who are making these assessments - saying that their area is going to be short in the next six months - expect to happen? If they made a plausible case, was the result going to be a great gift of food or money to their area? You can see what I am getting at: That people who are asking for things tend to look on the gloomiest possible projection. Were they just information

reports so that people would know or was there some action expected as a consequence?

Father Dureau - No. These people go there every three months, mostly for information. There is some aid coming through but it is not in this area of food production, et cetera. The amount of money available for immediate aid is minimal and certainly would not apply to these people here.

Senator HAMER - Would they expect no benefit from an overpessimistic assessment of their needs?

Father Dureau - I do not think so. We do not know.

Mr Waddingham - We understand the point but we really cannot answer the question. I should say, by the way, that these documents are not ordinarily public documents; they are generally internal aid organisation documents. I am not saying that you are suggesting that. Others have said before this Committee that these things are said to create publicity for poor conditions in East Timor. Certainly these things cannot be seen in that context. We are not in a position though to say whether or not a priest in a particular area of Timor says that if he says this he is likely to get more aid, or something like that. We are not in a position to say one way or the other on that.

Senator BOLKUS - When you say that these documents are internal organisational aid documents, you are referring only to document 6, are you not?

Mr Waddingham - There are others as well but in this case I am talking about that document. It would go ordinarily to a number of international Catholic aid organisations which do fund programs of the Dili church. I will briefly go on to some impressions we had about the East Timorese administration in East Timor - that is, those East Timorese who are working in the formal Indonesian structures in East Timor. I suspect you have already heard some evidence of the now quite well known document put together by the Provincial Assembly in June last year, a letter plus a report signed by two members of the Provincial Assembly, in which the report claimed that East Timorese officials have very little power, that money is misdirected, that development projects said to exist do not really exist and that there is gross mistreatment of the population. I will briefly confer with my colleague because we have not discussed this. It has been said that the people who signed this document really did not know what they were doing, that it was a fake or that they did not really know what was in the document. We spoke to their lawyer while we were in Indonesia - the lawyer who represented them following their arrest - and he is in no doubt that the document was a real document and that they did indeed know what they were doing. So I offer that for a piece of information about it, as recently one of the people has been interviewed - I think Mr Whitlam and Mr Hastings met one of the people, as has recently another journalist - and now one of those people is

saying he denied signing it or that it was a fake. Our information from his lawyer is that it certainly was no fake. His suggestion is that person is now under pressure to say that it is not a genuine document.

A couple of things we heard about the Governor: At the time we were in Jakarta the Governor, Guilherme Goncalves, was in Jakarta at the same time. We understood from Timorese who had spoken to him that he was fighting for his position. He is complaining that he has no power in East Timor and that all decisions are really made by the Indonesian officials there. He was in Jakarta seeking an affirmation from the highest levels that he did indeed still have his job and was saying he would not go back to Dili until he could be assured of that. One of the contentious issues it seems - and there has even been material in the Press in the last few days about this - is that he profits from the coffee in East Timor. Possibly I can go into that again this afternoon. We also heard that even the Vice-Governor, Lopes da Cruz, is distrusted in East Timor. At the time we were there we were told he was not really even working in his office. These are hearsay comments - I will admit that - but they are the sorts of comments which have been given to us and reflect what has been said often in Timor, that Timorese officials complain they have no power.

Also while we were in Jakarta there was a meeting of all regional administrators of East Timor - the bupati. We did not

visit them and we did not speak to them, but we did speak to one Indonesian and one Timorese who had detailed conversations with them. Their comments were that things are bad in Timor but they could not say anything. If they wrote a letter to the President they were in trouble. The Indonesian, whom we might mention a little later, who has had long contact with East Timor and was originally involved in the program to take over East Timor suggested to them directly that they should write a detailed presentation to the President but they said they were in fear of doing that. I want to also mention in this context a set of documents which we collected in Indonesia which we have not given to the Committee and at this stage we are reluctant to give, but I might briefly address them. We were able to obtain a set of internal military documents which are essentially records of interrogations conducted in East Timor early last year in the provincial town of Liquica, on the north coast just west of Dili. There is quite a lot of material there but in essence the story was this: According to the information, some 103 people were arrested in early 1981. They were charged essentially with planning to take over by force two towns west of Dili, namely, Liquica and a much smaller place called Basateq. Among this group of 103 were a number of senior provincial officials - some 11 or 12 senior officials in that district.

According to the records of interrogation, at various times different members of the group were involved in meetings in Dili

and in Liquica to discuss, firstly, this plan to take over these two towns and, secondly, to discuss why they were doing it and the problems they were facing. The sorts of issues they were discussing were the coffee industry, the misuse of development funds, aid distribution and the poor quality of actual development. There is one story there: They talked about asphaltting roads, which is really putting asphalt over an unprepared base, and the problem of not really having any power as officials. Also, according to these records of interrogation, they had contacts with the resistance in the bush. Our information is - and we cannot confirm this - that 100 of those 103 were tortured during their interrogation. We have copies of letters from two of those people who gave witness.

One of them says 'These things did go on but I did not agree with the plan to take over these two towns; I did not want to tell this story but I was forced', and he gives details of his torture. He does not give details; he just says what modes of torture he suffered. A letter from another person accused of being involved in this, who also was interrogated, says he had nothing to do with it but he was threatened with torture so he had no choice.

We are not in a position to make a judgment about the documents - we have them with very little outside information on them - but it seems to me there are three conclusions one can draw, and I just remind you they are official and internal documents. Firstly, none of this ever happened or for some reason all these Timorese gave testimony saying things they simply did not do; secondly, they did not do these things but were forced to say them for some reason; or, thirdly, they did say them. Legal people may be able to offer us other possibilities but, whatever way one goes, that set of documents seems to support a basic claim and that is that even people who are in the administration are either dissatisfied with what is happening in their country or do not get on with the Indonesian administration in East Timor. The reason we are reluctant to pass over the documents at this stage is that we were advised that any sort of circulation of them at all and certainly any publicity about them, even as a set of documents, could endanger

the lives of some of those people. Certainly some of them are still alive. We have made contacts with Amnesty International and at present there is a visitor going to Geneva where we are seeking advice from International Red Cross about this. At this stage we are reluctant to pass over the documents until we can have some sort of guarantee of their security should there be any circulation or general knowledge of these documents.

Father Dureau - The amount of information in these interrogations is not particularly lengthy or worth while. It consists of questions like: Who are you; are you mentally and physically healthy; where do you live; who is your mother and who is your father? But the fact of the documents is very important for me, namely that here are a lot of top level government officials, Indonesian-appointed government officials - Timorese - who are plotting not only to do something about their country but to completely overthrow the existing government. That is important. Secondly, all the claims that are made substantiate the sort of things that we got in interviews. These are claims made by the top people in the government administration of Timor. I think those are both very important facts.

Mr Waddingham - We are happy, of course, for them to be examined, that they do exist.

Father Dureau - As far as we know, this is the first evidence that there was such a highly sophisticated and top level coup

planned and apparently, the evidence we have is, it was discovered two days prior to the day of execution.

Senator HAMER - That was not relating to the attack on Dili or the attack on the radio station?

Father Dureau - No.

Mr Waddingham - This is quite some time later. The meetings are occurring late in 1980 and the date, according to these records, is that they were planning to implement this event on 20 January 1981.

Father Dureau - These interrogations date from March, April, May, June 1981.

CHAIRMAN - Did you tell us how those documents came to be with you? Did they come through Church channels or some other?

Senator HAMER - That might be the most sensitive part of all.

Mr Waddingham - It is indeed the most sensitive question. The short answer is that we are very reluctant to disclose that. In fact, only Father Dureau and I know who gave them to us. We have not passed that on to anyone else. I think perhaps you can understand the need for that security. They are internal documents. They are marked 'Secret' and I think we would not be prepared to disclose the source.

Father Dureau - They are state documents. In other words, they are not public.

CHAIRMAN - We have had a number of views on the freedom of religion in East Timor. How do you see the situation there and

how do you see the relationship between the Church in East Timor and its counterpart in Indonesia?

Father Dureau - This is one of the reasons why my other organisation, the Asian Bureau Australia, would like to address the Senate Committee, because we have a fair amount of both information and experience on the sorts of situations comparing an Indonesian Church type model approach to the government and the sort of model that the Timorese Church is involved with. It seems to me, looking at the evidence that we have, that firstly there is strong support for the Church and the Church people in what evidence we have. There is also on the part of some people misunderstanding and concern about why the Church will not accept the government assistance and why the Church will not accept integration, et cetera. Other people ask 'Why does the Church not become united; why do all the priests not become united?' because there are some differences in factions. There are some groups that support integration; there are some groups that are anti-integration; and there are some groups that are somewhere between.

It seems to me that the Church is being forced into a situation by constant pressure and by the people to take a more and more political stand. In other words, it is being forced to stand for the people against the injustice of their suffering which puts them against the government. Its role initially was neutral: We are not going to interfere. That has led people to

say 'Either you are for the Indonesians or you are against them'  
- or to put it another way - 'Either you are against the  
Indonesians or you are for the people'. This is the position it  
seems to be in at the moment.

In other words, it is constantly being put on the side of the people because it happens to want to intervene in cases of injustice or it happens to want to say that this is actually what is happening and that those things that are being said are not true and so on. It seems also that the Indonesian army in Timor considers the Church as its biggest stumbling block because the Church speaks the truth and because of its independence, et cetera, it can do this. It does not have much fear. Also, the Church is listened to by a number of top level Indonesian officials not involved in Timor. When I say not involved, I mean not directly involved. Ali Murtopo, for instance, was directly involved in Timor in the early stage. His whole program and his whole political career actually depends on the success or failure of Timor. But it is out of his control now. He has been secretly meeting with the Bishop of Dili. General Yussuf, who is also a very important man in Indonesian politics today, has also been meeting privately with Church officials according to the information we have. He is in charge of the overall control of the armed forces of Indonesia, though he is not in direct control of East Timor. So there is a certain ambiguity. It seems that there is a politicisation of the Church going on. It is becoming the institution that stands in opposition to corruption and injustice on the part of the government.

Senator PRIMMER - You mentioned the Bishop of Dili. Is there really a bishop of Dili?

Father Dureau - Indonesians do not make fine distinctions between bishops, apostolic administrators, monsignors, cardinals or whatever. He is the head of the Church, and everybody who is a head of the Church is called a bishop. It is just a common term.

CHAIRMAN - In the various talks you have had, have you learned something of the difference in the conditions relating to health and education and so on of the people in West Timor and those in East Timor? Can you say how their conditions compare?

Mr Waddingham - The short answer is no. I have no information on this. Nor did we collect any information on conditions in West Timor.

CHAIRMAN - In the longer term there would be some significance in being able to identify the circumstances there, I imagine.

Father Dureau - We did get indications that the patterns were dissimilar to what is happening in other provinces. For instance, a lot of the local Timorese are being replaced by people from other parts of Indonesia in health and education programs. In other words, the local Timorese are at a disadvantage in Timor in job opportunities and in access to health services and so on.

Senator HAMER - Would that be because of education and language as much as anything or is there an actual discrimination against them? Would a Timorese of equal qualification, training

and knowledge of the administration and language be discriminated against as opposed to an outsider?

Father Dureau - I think both things apply. In other words, the Indonesians bring in a set of laws which disqualify the Timorese because they have not got the qualifications. For instance, Timorese teachers may not have specified Indonesian qualifications as teachers because Indonesia is much more organised, obviously, than Timor was. They may not have those qualifications so the Indonesians bring in Indonesian teachers. They rigidly apply those qualifications, which is discriminatory.

Senator PRIMMER - What evidence, if any, were you able to get as to the extent of transmigration to East Timor? There seems to have been a policy in West Irian of moving quite large numbers of people, particularly to the Papua New Guinea border.

Senator MacGIBBON - What do you understand by the doctrine or the policy of transmigration in Indonesia? What is your understanding of the Indonesian Government's practice of transmigration? What do you understand about that in general terms? Do not go on to a particular case.

Father Dureau - What I understand the question to be about and the practice of transmigration to be about is the movement of people who apply, either village groups or individuals, from one area of Indonesia to another area of Indonesia.

Senator MacGIBBON - Who initiates that?

Father Dureau - It is different.

Senator MacGIBBON- Is it a government planning organisation?

Father Dureau - It is a government planning organisation dealing with transmigration. It is called Tenaga Kerja.

Senator MacGIBBON - What I do not understand is why they do it. Do they do it for developmental purposes, because there is a population shortage there? Or do they do it for political stability? Do they do it to break up groups or anything?

Father Dureau - No. The practice would normally be carried out because there are 80 million people in Java and Bali, which is only about one-sixth of the land mass of Indonesia. In other words, there is a tremendous concentration of population in a small area. So they do it for that reason. They may be building a dam in one area so that whole population is forced to move to another area. In that case it is different from the normal practice, which is to say that anybody who wants to move from this area can do so. It is normally voluntary.

Senator MacGIBBON - Is it a major policy or is it a minor policy?

Father Dureau - It is a major policy which is perhaps having a minor impact, for a variety of reasons.

Mr Waddingham - As far as transmigration in Timor is concerned, I have heard elsewhere that East Timor is now officially on the books as a transmigration area. At the time we were in Jakarta, we only heard evidence of two specific transmigration programs. One was of 50 families to Maliana where there is an agricultural project, and the other was the prospect of another 50 families going somewhere over in the east of East Timor. It is a small number at this stage. In addition to this formal transmigration program we also heard that the population of Dili has doubled since 1975. Half of those people are Indonesians who are not there as official transmigrants but they are people who have gone there to become part of the economic infrastructure in Dili. I have heard in the last few days more recent information that suggests a much bigger program. At the time we were in Jakarta we had heard only about its beginnings.

Father Dureau - We also heard from one interviewer who said that he had a friend in the relevant government section responsible for transmigration and that he had seen documentation that in 1983 and 1984 large scale transmigration programs would begin to take place to Timor and from Timor to other parts.

Senator BOLKUS - You also refer in document 7 to 200 Indonesian nuclear families occupying the better soils of the country of East Timor. Is that part of that program, or is it separate?

Father Dureau - It could very well be. We are not sure about that. Another person said that he had heard that 400 or 600 Balinese families were moved from Bali to Timor. Other evidence I received said that they were about to go. I am not too sure whether they had actually gone or were about to go.

Mr Waddingham - We did not speak to the person who wrote that document and so we were not in a position to go into the details of that claim.

Senator MacGIBBON - Do you think it is a temptation for the Indonesian government with the different ethnic and religious groupings they have to move trouble makers around, split them up, and use this program as a cloak for it?

CHAIRMAN - The Balinese would be regarded as having some particular skills in the fields of irrigation. That would perhaps be one of the reasons that some, at least, might move into the relatively undeveloped areas of Timor.

Father Dureau - It is certainly the reason the Indonesians give.

Mr Waddingham - One of the very interesting things about the whole question of the development of East Timor - and I will certainly be making comments about this this afternoon - is that one may well argue that the movement of Balinese farmers into a certain area, and Indonesian officials are saying this, to teach East Timorese new agricultural methods may have long term benefits, but the initial reaction of the East Timorese is not

that they are going to teach them new farming methods, but that, firstly, they are moving on to land that used to be theirs and, secondly, this is the final act of incorporation where they will become a minority in their own country. We are talking about transitions; I think it is a theoretical position to say that the East Timorese will be advanced by that process. I think it is theoretical. Nevertheless, the immediate reaction of the Timorese is against it for those reasons.

Senator BOLKUS - You mention in your initial submission that you have some comments to make about the family reunion program.

Mr Waddingham - I know that Senator Bolkus in Canberra has already had a detailed submission from the family reunion people. I think the bits and pieces we collected do not throw a terrific amount of new light on it. You will find in some of our interviews in various parts that that material is just about some specifics on costs - costs of exit permits and that sort of thing. Is that okay?

Senator BOLKUS - Yes.

Senator MacGIBBON - Does the resettlement program in any way get mixed up with transmigration or is the resettlement program, as it has been described to us by some witnesses, really a political concentration camp? One witness described it that way.

Father Dureau - The fact that there is a resettlement program must be distinguished from the effect of what is happening on the people. Resettlement programs to re-educate people - using this

slash and burn method - is common in Indonesia and in those areas. It is not working in any area, as I understand it. There is so much dissatisfaction. It does work in some areas where they move them into very well set up and fairly ideal conditions. They are using the same technique in East Timor, but it seems that their major aim, at this stage anyway, is strategic and their major concern is to isolate them from contact with guerrillas and Fretilin. This is one of the main contentions of Indonesians about what is happening in Timor - namely, that it is being run by people who are incompetent to run it, military people, and also military people whose only aim is the suppression of the people, the security of the nation and the assured guarantee that that command of the military is successful and therefore has chalked up a good record. That is being a little cynical, but this is the way Indonesians who are well informed put it themselves. To answer your question, the resettlement program is a common policy in Indonesia but in this case it seems that it is implemented for mostly strategic reasons.

Senator MacGIBBON - Talking about the guerrilla side of it, roughly how many guerrillas are there?

Father Dureau - We do not really know. We have not any idea really. There is some evidence that we have for instance from one person who was quite a high official in the Fretilin and who was also a very important official in the Indonesian and interrogation forces and censorship and a number of other things. He says that there may be 3,000 weapons still available to the Fretilin. Some people say that the guerrilla forces still are the minor force - a very small force.

Senator MacGIBBON - I think it was in the low thousands - not in the tens of thousands.

Mr Waddingham - We really did not collect that definitive information. Really people do vary. I think the overriding summation of the East Timorese we spoke to was resistance still does exist. It has the passive support of probably most of the population and the active support of some of the population. But we did not find anyone who was convinced among the Timorese. I can only think of one Timorese who was prepared to say that it is still the major and integrated force throughout the territory. Most were inclined to say that it is not so well co-ordinated. Really beyond that we did not get any definitive statement. Indeed some Timorese say the operation that occurred last year and other events are not necessarily to fight the resistance. Some Timorese claim that the resistance is small. These operations are put on, if you like, in their terms - I am only quoting them - to get rid of us. We are a problem. We do not

accept intregation. We are not fighting. But we are still a problem or some members of the army want trouble to continue to occur, or have an appearance of trouble in Timor, so that they can get more funds and justify their presence there. So there are some divisions even amongst Timorese on what the actual state of the resistance is and the reasons why the army continues to conduct military operations. But in terms of numbers we certainly did not gather anything definitive at all.

CHAIRMAN - As the period when Portuguese basic control came towards its end there followed as I recall a period of civil war which finalised a situation in which there was a short term, or interim, I do not know how you would describe it, government controlled by the victors in the civil war. Have you in your discussions with the Timorese and/or Indonesians had any indications that there was a real measure of satisfaction or likely to be a real measure of satisfaction with the resolution of that civil war?

Mr Waddingham - It is a complicated question. The first observation is that the interim de facto administration was not in power for very long. So I think it is very hard to make a projection or make some guesses as to whether or not that administration would have been acceptable. I think there is simply not enough time to say whether that would be the case. All one can do at that stage is refer to the reports of people who were in Timor at that time to see what they observed. What

is clear though at that time was that East Timor was divided fairly bitterly - certainly amongst the elite and in certain regions of East Timor. One of the things that we did hear in Jakarta was that many of the East Timorese, even those who were active in UDT and active even in Apodeti - remember these parties finally took a pro-integration stance - many of those people now do not co-operate with the Indonesian integration. They are opposed to it. Many of them actually joined the resistance. I think we simply cannot say whether they would have accepted the previous administration. It was only two months long or something like that.

CHAIRMAN - I thought perhaps you had heard some reflections on it.

Mr Waddingham - Some Timorese still see Fretilin as the expression of the aspirations of the East Timorese. Other Timorese still do not accept that. They see the resistance now not as Fretilin as such but as the nationalist resistance and have some support for them. All I can say is from what we heard and I am certainly adding to what I have heard over the years but certainly in Jakarta it was said that even those who even initially were supporting the Indonesian takeover are now opposed to it. We could add in here one Indonesian to whom we spoke and whose name we certainly cannot give you, but who was directly involved in the covert Indonesian operations from 1974 to take over East Timor. He now concedes that most East Timorese reject

it and have suffered badly and concedes that most East Timorese do not want to be part of Indonesia. I think it is a significant little event. There is one other area that I would like to briefly mention and draw your attention to. Documents 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 contain information from the East Timorese who were in East Timor at the time of the major military operations last year. I draw your attention to them as a picture of how Timorese reacted to that event. They were filled if anything with confusion and anger. But there are a number of specific things that are mentioned. So I draw your attention to them as indications of the East Timorese feelings about the operation.

I would just like to mention one specific event that has received some publicity. That is an allegation that during or at the end of those operations, a large number of people were killed at one place in East Timor, the place being Lacluta in the south of East Timor. We sought information on this and we did not come up with the ultimate and defined account of what happened, but I will pass on to you the information we did hear. All East Timorese believe it happened. If you ask an East Timorese how he knows, he will say that everyone knows. That is not good enough as evidence. The bishop, the apostolic administrator of East Timor, has been quoted as saying that some 500 people were killed. We do not know the names of the individuals, but we understand that a considerable number of East Timorese who were involved in that event and who were in the Indonesian army and responsible for it at least in part, themselves told the head of the Dili Church. There are a number of differences in the specific account of what happened.

Broadly we understand that during this operation a number of people were trapped essentially in a village. That place was shot up during the night. It was only the following morning that it was found that a significant number of these people were women and children. The actual number is still elusive. Some people were saying about 400. I have seen quotes from another priest in East Timor saying 300. Some individuals within the Indonesian Church who have had a chance to investigate this believe that the

figure of 500 may be an exaggeration - it could be of the order of 200 and it may be more than that. Photographs were taken of the event. We have spoken to someone who has seen photographs, but we were not able to see them ourselves. We were also informed that General Benny Moerdani, who is the overall commander of the East Timor operation, is admitting privately that 80 were killed. In the words of our informant, that is the least he can get away with admitting. Our informant was suggesting that there were actually a lot more but he knows he cannot say it was any fewer than that. I just offer that information on this event. I am sure you have heard information on it and will hear more information on it.

One of the other things that was often mentioned was the diversion of aid. All East Timorese say aid is misdirected, but it is difficult, as I am sure the Committee has already found, to get specific stories. We heard some specific stories. One of these stories was dated July 1981. I personally spoke to an East Timorese who visited the resettlement site on the outskirts of Dili called Lahane. He spoke to the East Timorese government official there who pointed out women cleaning some rice. The East Timorese official told him that the rice was meant to be for the people in the resettlement site - it came from the central government - but that the women were cleaning it for the army. He said they would not get the rice - the army would sell it. That is one specific story. We heard a specific story of a

diversion of International Red Cross aid in 1979. That is going back a way. This was from an East Timorese who was working for International Red Cross at a place called Beaco on the south coast. We also spoke to a Timorese who had talked to an International Red Cross representative in Jakarta. We are not sure whether it was November last year or March this year. He spoke in some detail to him. The East Timorese claimed the International Red Cross bloke was admitting that at least in some areas up to 45 per cent of the aid does not get through. They do this by occasional checks. They go to people and ask how much of a certain item they have got and then compare that with what they should have received. I just offer that as some data on specific claims made to us about the misdirection of aid. It is a frequent claim by Timorese.

CHAIRMAN - We have had allegations of that sort of misdirection. I wonder whether you have any views on how this sort of misdirection, if it is a fact, can be overcome. It is not an easy problem. Do you have any views on how it could be approached and how we could make constructive comment?

Father Dureau - We speak for the Timorese but it seems quite clear what they would like. They would like to take control of the distribution of it. They have adequate officials, they have a governor, they have a vice-governor, they have regional representatives and they have church officials. What they are saying is that all these are being by-passed - it is being

controlled by Indonesian officials and Indonesian military people.

Mr Waddingham - Is the Committee likely to be able to speak to International Red Cross? I am sure it would have some observations to make in confidence. My private understanding is that one of the complaints of International Red Cross, even since the inception of its program, was that it has had very little opportunity to monitor in detail its distribution. Certainly that is the case now, although it was less the case up until April 1981. Catholic Relief services have never been permitted to have someone permanently stationed in East Timor. International Red Cross did have three people in East Timor up until April 1981 but no longer has them.

I suppose my reactions are that one hopes this could be got around by having a greater degree of control over the process. The picture which was put to us in general terms was that there are East Timorese and Indonesians by and large involved in the process of distribution. Army commanders in the area have the power in that area and if complaints are made about aid being misdirected at least, as one person put it, people are threatened with being shot if they say that because they are regarded as being the Fretilin - it is a coercion type of thing. So by and large the aid distribution has not been subject to direct on-the-spot control by the international aid agencies which have been responsible for its distribution. On first principles, within the limits of the difficulties of doing it anyway by the numbers of personnel, I thought the first thing might have been a greater degree of control of the process.

We have had communication with the International Red Cross. There has been nothing definite about it. It has got into a very difficult position I think and it has got into the internal trouble but we will not go into that. Its association with quite directly political trips late last year and the Hastings-Whitlam trip this year I think has caused some problems within International Red Cross because of its seeming to be associated with political exercises. That was the reason I think why they were reluctant to see us in Jakarta. This was immediately after the Whitlam-Hastings event.

Senator BOLKUS - On that Whitlam-Hastings trip and referring to document 6, do you find any major conflict between what Mr Hastings and Mr Whitlam saw and reported on and document 6? Did you discuss different regions and different areas of document 6?

Mr Waddingham - There is some coincidence I think between them. First of all I think Mr Whitlam has nothing but general comments to offer. I think Mr Whitlam's comments do not come up very well when one compares them with Mr Hastings' findings. Mr Hastings visited six or eight places. He admits to potential food shortages in a couple of areas and alludes to the possibility of shortages in other areas due to in part climatic things but also possibly due to the operation last year. What I have not done is sit down and look at Mr Hastings' claims. I think he mentions two places specifically where he thinks there will be food shortages. As I remember, they do coincide with the Church's claims about where food shortages will be. There are a number of areas mentioned by the Church report which Mr Hastings and Mr Whitlam did not visit, so there is no way we can make the comparisons there. I think this document 6 is suggesting that the situation is worse than Mr Hastings was saying in total.

Father Dureau - There are several other remarks which could be made about that. If you look through the interview material you will find many people commented on it, mostly in terms of there being areas which are fertile, as was pointed out by Senator MacGibbon - or Senator Primmer, I am not sure - and they

could have visited those areas but there are certainly many areas which are really not fertile and really bad and it is quite possible that they visited only areas which are fertile.

Mr Waddingham - The other thing about that trip is that - I have seen some material on this but I cannot recall it offhand - certainly some of the places which Mr Whitlam and Mr Hastings visited were also places which have been under some ICRC program for the last two years. Two of the places they visited - Suai and Maliana - have always been good agricultural areas and it would indeed have been surprising to have found food shortages there too. I think the Whitlam-Hastings trip was a very limited trip. They were there for three days. I will be drawing attention this afternoon, if it has not already been drawn, to a couple of recent articles - one in the 'Asian Wall Street Journal' and another in the Philadelphia 'Inquirer' - which talk about the food situation. My immediate reaction to the Philadelphia 'Inquirer' article was that it seemed to be quite coincident with what is essentially a prediction in document 6.

CHAIRMAN - Some of those documents - the pen documents - describe circumstances and behaviour which is bestial and depraved. Do you think there is any overdose of emotionalism or do you think, indeed, that sort of depravity is factual? Again that is pretty hard to answer.

Father Dureau - Yes, it is.

CHAIRMAN - But it does create a measure of wonderment.

Mr Waddingham - Some of the things described are in the realm of the unbelievable.

CHAIRMAN - I wondered what your view was?

Mr Waddingham - I think there is an added thing one can say, that one will hear the Timorese make a general statement that this and that happens. I do not know whether the senators have seen the program on Ireland on the ABC a few months ago where events in a sense are expanded a little and become myths and part of the consciousness of the people. I am not saying this is the case, but it is possible it is the case that what has happened in East Timor has been a major traumatic experience for East Timorese. An event may have occurred, news of which spreads very widely and confirms the view of East Timorese: 'That is indeed the attitude of the Indonesian army toward us.' I am saying that is a possibility; I do not know that is the case. I admit some of those things are extraordinary but they are reported.

As the Committee has already found and as I know from long experience, the isolation of East Timor in the end makes it very difficult to confirm these things. certainly a three-day or even a 12-day trip to East Timor is unlikely to allow you to confirm or otherwise those things. I should add that Father Dureau spoke to one person who was involved in interrogations and, certainly, in the use of torture. We would have no question about this person, who was in the room during such interrogations, was an interpreter for them, and would attest to the unacceptable, gross mistreatment of East Timorese in those conditions.

Father Dureau - By way of conclusion I would like to say two things. The first is that it is impossible to do justice to these documents as a body because the value of these documents is that the evidence is cumulative. You read one interview and it says A, B and C; you read another view and it says the same thing; and another view; and another view. It may be that we have not been selective enough in whom we interviewed, but when you look through them you will find that there is a tremendous cumulative effect going on through these. I personally did not realise, having lived in Indonesia for 10 years, just how bad the situation really was. It was new to me. It was something that I began to realise only as I went into it in great depth. That is the first point, the cumulative effect of reading through these documents. The second point I would like to make is that some of the documents are not just individuals' writings but are quite

substantial. For example, document 1 is a reflection of the information that the East Timorese religious - that is, the nuns, the brothers and the sisters - have been gathering over a period of years to report to the Indonesian counterpart religious organisation - nuns, brothers and sisters - about their situation. I would like to quote from their last statement made in September 1981. Here they say as their introduction:

We must all realise that the Indonesian National Army which liberated Indonesia from the colonial power in an astonishing manner will never liberate the people of East Timor from their colonial situation towards autonomy and national independence because its situation and reality are very different.

In the next paragraph they say:

That which has taken place during these five years is significantly: Invasion, war, looting, the destruction of the indigenous population, territorial subjection, colonial exploitation, the expulsion of the indigenous population who are replaced by people from other islands, military occupation, attempts for mass mobilisation of people (from 12 to 55 years) to make war on each other. Actually the wish and desire of the East Timorese people from the beginning has been the right to determine their own fate and not mass murders such as have been done by their neighbours.

The document then goes on to list the various aspects of their situation. That seems to me to be a very significant statement by 45 to 50 people spread throughout the whole of the island.

CHAIRMAN - Thank you very much, gentlemen, for talking with us.

Short adjournment