

((Extract from Chamberlain, E., “The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in rural East Timor” – 2008, revised))

THE CEASEFIRE – 1983

By 1983, the Resistance was in disarray. In March 1981, Xanana Gusmão had been elected CRRN chairman (as related earlier) and, while contact with ABRI was avoided, harassment by ABRI forces and heavy Falintil casualties continued - particularly during ABRI's continuing *Operasi Keamanan* (Security). Xanana had spent most of 1982 in the forests of Lautém District, meeting briefly in September with the Apostolic Administrator of the Dili Archdiocese, Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes.¹ Monsignor Martinho was reportedly sympathetic to the Resistance, but urged moderation and warned against the excesses of communism.² He reportedly urged “national unity between UDT and Fretilin ... at first, Xanana Gusmão rejected the idea, but slowly it became more acceptable until in 1983 the PMLF Central Committee affirmed National Unity (*Unidade Nacional*) as its official policy.”³

In late 1982, Colonel Purwanto⁴ - the newly-appointed Korem 164 commander, through a Kopassandha officer (Major Stevanus Gatot Purwanto⁵) made contact with a senior Fretilin leader of the *Funu Sei Nafatin* (Eastern) Region, José da Conceição (Jony).⁶

¹ Lennox, R., *The Fighting Spirit of East Timor: The Life of Martinho Da Costa Lopes*, Pluto, Annandale, 2000, p.188. Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, a Timorese (b.1918), had been appointed Apostolic Administrator ie “acting bishop” in 1981 – he was replaced by Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo on 12 May 1983 ie Bishop Belo from 19 June 1988. Monsignor Martinho (Dom Martinho) died on 27 February 1991. The meeting is also related in Niner, S., *Xanana - Leader of the Struggle ...*, 2009, op.cit., pp.82-83.

² Jolliffe, J., “Former East Timor Church Leader Dies”, *The Guardian*, London, 1 March 1991.

³ *Chega !*, CAVR Final Report, Part 5, para 115 – also notes that their meeting occurred at Mehara.

⁴ Purwanto, an artillery officer, was appointed Danrem 164 in about September 1982. He is sometimes confused with the Kopassandha officer Major Stevanus/Stefanus Gatot Purwanto (*Nanggala 52*) who acted as the principal ABRI liaison officer for the ceasefire negotiations – see the following footnote. Colonel Purwanto's approach to Falintil was reportedly directed by the Indonesian Minister of Defence, General Yusuf. The official history of Kodam IX/Udayana states “in 1982, the Commander of Korem 164/Wiradharma, in his capacity as ‘*Harian Laksusda Nusra*’ (Routine Special Executive for the Lesser Sundas), made *kontak damai* (peaceful contact) with the GPK with the objective of making them ‘aware’ and ‘attracting’ their followers” - *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) – Kodam IX/Udayana, 42 Tahun Pengabdian Kodam IX Udayana* (42 Years of Service by Military Region IX, Udayana), Kodam IX/Udayana, Denpasar, 27 Mei (May) 1999, p.65. The author is yet to access an ABRI account of the ceasefire ie Kodam XVI/Udayana - Korem 164/WD, *Analisa Kontak Damai 11 Desember 1982 - 4 Juni 1983* (An Analysis of the Ceasefire – 11 December 1982 to 4 June 1983), Dili, 1983. For Gatot Purwanto's later career see also footnote 506.

⁵ Lieutenant Stevanus Gatot Purwanto had served in Portuguese Timor in August–November 1975 as the operations officer of the Kopassandha Tim Susi – including during the attack on Balibo on 16 October 1975. He later served in Timor in the Kopassandha *Nanggala 13* in late 1976. In December 2009, as a retired Colonel, Stevanus Gatot Purwanto related his involvement in the ceasefire negotiations – see Tempo, “Balibo: the Film and the Reality”, No.15/X, Jakarta, 8-14 December 2009. In 1991, as a Lieutenant Colonel, Gatot Purwanto was appointed Asintel, Korem 164/Kolakops – and, following the ABRI Honour Council investigation into the Santa Cruz massacre of 12 November 1991, he was “honourably dismissed” from ABRI in February 1992. In a 1998 interview, Gatot Purwanto described how he had deceived Xanana Gusmão in 1983 and prevent a meeting between Gusmão and a visiting Australian parliamentary delegation – Gatra, “*Sengketa di Timor Timur Memang Kejam*”, 47/IV, Jakarta, 10 October 1998. For the Australian Parliamentary Delegation – see footnotes 471 and 510.

⁶ José da Conceição (Jony - born Irahara, Los Palos) was the Assistant Commisar of the Eastern Region. At the end of the ceasefire, he did not return to the jungle but assisted ABRI against Falintil and the *Klandestin* movement. He is regarded by Fretilin/Falintil as a traitor and currently (2008) lives in West (Indonesian) Timor. The participation of Victor da Costa in visits to Jakarta has yet to be confirmed. Mau Velis (Martinho Pereira/Orlando José Maria – Maupitine/Mehara village) may also have participated in the visits to Jakarta.

This contact was initially through the former *Camat* (Sub-District Administrator) of Moro (Lautém) and the *raja/régulo* of Los Palos, Veríssimo/Veríssimo Dias Quintas⁷ – meeting José da Conceição and the local Falintil leader, Lari Mau (Justo Bernadino)⁸. Major Gatot Purwanto first met with Lari Mau at Pupura/Rasira⁹, southwest of Los Palos town, to discuss possibilities for a cessation of hostilities – Lari Mau was escorted by a dozen Falintil fighters and the ABRI contingent reportedly included armoured vehicles. According to Governor Mário Carrascalão, these early meetings were also facilitated by principals of the Apodeti party – in particular Daniel Baptista, the Bupati of Viqueque (*Administrador Interino de Conselho de Viqueque*) and a Timorese ABRI intelligence operative, Labut Melo.¹⁰ In late 1982/early 1983, Major Gatot Purwanto held further meetings with José da Conceição – and, with Xanana Gusmão’s agreement, Major Gatot Purwanto escorted José da Conceição and two other Falintil: Victor da Costa (interpreter) and Falo Chai (ie, Fernando Teles, a senior Falintil field commander - see footnote 465) to Jakarta for an orientation/confidence-building visit.¹¹

The previous Resistance policy of “negotiations – no and never” (*“negociação – não & nunca”*)¹² was abandoned, and Xanana Gusmão directed Falintil’s Talisman Sub-Region (of the *Funu Sei Nafatin* Region) to prepare future meeting venues. On 24 December 1982, Xanana Gusmão wrote to Governor Carrascalão¹³ – but negotiations of substance were only conducted with ABRI officers.

Soon after, in the first months of 1983, Xanana Gusmão responded to the Indonesian initiatives by agreeing to a ceasefire – or period of *“kontak damai/cessar-fogo”* (Bahasa: “peaceful contact”¹⁴/Portuguese: “ceasefire”) with ABRI. Xanana Gusmão’s aims were to gain some respite for Falintil, to re-establish contact with the few *Klandestin* cadre still active in the villages and towns, and to publicise the Resistance movement internationally. A ceasefire would also provide the opportunity to promote the recently-launched “National Unity Policy” of the Resistance in which the role of all nationalists,

⁷ The sequence of meetings and some detail is based on the author’s discussions with F-FDTL Lieutenant Bersama (Mário Baptista) in Dili on 27 July 2005. Bersama served as an aide to Falintil *Comandante* Saudoso (Konis Santana) in the period 1983-1986. Veríssimo/Veríssimo Dias Quintas/Quintão was killed by pro-integration militia in Los Palos on 27 August 1999 – see footnote 712. Carrascalão, M.V., *Timor – Antes do Futuro*, Mau Huran Printing, Timor-Leste, 2006, p.183 refers to facilitation by “the Liurai of Los Palos and friend of Xanana Gusmão, Filipe Dias Quintas”.

⁸ Lari Mau, a 24-year Falintil veteran of Ira Lafai village (Los Palos), was serving as a senior sergeant in the F-FDTL in 2006.

⁹ Another F-FDTL source indicated the initial meeting occurred near Wailana sub-village about 20 kilometres south of Los Palos – and that later meetings also took place in Home and Moro villages north of Los Palos. *Chega !*, CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 409 notes meetings at “Pupuru” and “Pasikenu” – occurring weekly by February 1983.

¹⁰ Carrascalão, M.V., *Timor – Antes do Futuro*, 2006, p.177 – these Apodeti contacts with Falintil were managed by ABRI Captain Azis (an engineer officer serving in the intelligence service).

¹¹ Conboy, K., *Kopassus*, 2003, pp. 298-299 based on interviews in mid-1999 - including with Stefanus Gatot Purwanto, notes that in early 1983 Major Gatot Purwanto escorted a Fretilin leader to Jakarta for a “five-day sightseeing trip” – but does not provide a name. Lowry, R. (email to author, 17 May 2003) confirmed that José da Conceição was accompanied to Jakarta by Falintil commander Falo Chai (Fernando Teles). Up to three visits may have been made to Jakarta.

¹² The principle of “no negotiations” had been declared by Fretilin’s Supreme Command of the Struggle in April 1977.

¹³ Carrascalão, M.V., *Timor – Antes do Futuro*, 2006, pp.179-180 includes Governor Carrascalão’s reply to Xanana Gusmão dated 2 February 1983.

¹⁴ The Indonesian side used the term *“kontak damai”* – avoiding the Bahasa term for “ceasefire” ie *“gencatan senjata”*.

including the emerging student movement, was now recognised. ABRI was also reportedly war-weary and accepted the proposal – but did not want such to be made public.¹⁵

In Lautém, on 6 and 10 January 1983 substantive meetings were reportedly held at “Tcharu” southwest of Los Palos to negotiate conditions for a ceasefire – which, on the Resistance side, included political, military and *nurep* elements ie, “*Foti Oin*”.¹⁶ In Iliomar, a meeting was held in Ailebere village in early January 1983 between Falintil and the *Tripida* (ie comprising Indonesian authorities, their Timorese appointees and Hansip)¹⁷ to discuss a local ceasefire.¹⁸ At this meeting, Falintil attendees comprised: Venâncio Savio with an armed party of 12, Falintil political officer Amilcar Rodrigues, Serasa (Orlando Jerónimo), Nami Hala (Roberto Jerónimo), Ernesto Pinto, Rui Nunes and António. The *Tripida* party reportedly included: Zé Roberto Seixas Miranda Jerónimo (the Iliomar *Camat* since February 1982), the Koramil 03 commander (Harifai) and the local ABRI Kopassus team leader (Umar). Seven village notables also attended – including Ailebere village chief, Américo Jerónimo.

At the “Province” level, initial formal ceasefire negotiations were held in late March 1983.¹⁹ Preliminary discussions were held at Falintil’s Gattot encampment (*Acampamento de Gattot* - Bibileu, Viqueque) involving Xanana Gusmão, Veríssimo Dias Quintas (*régulo* of Los Palos), Father Eligio Locatelli (Italian Roman Catholic/Salesian priest – Fatumaca, Baucau), Aleixo Ximenes (the Indonesian administration’s deputy for Baucau) and Major Stevanus Gatot Purwanto (Kopassandha, ABRI). Soon after, on 20 March, more senior Indonesian officers met with the Falintil leadership in the same vicinity at Buburaque/Bubu Rake/ (Liaruka village) in northwestern Viqueque District (about 12 kilometres southwest of Venilale) - participants included Xanana, Veríssimo Dias Quintas, Bere Malai Laka and ABRI officers: Major Williem da Costa, Major Stevanus Gatot Purwanto, and Captain Dayun.²⁰ Colonel Purwanto reportedly flew from Dili to Bali on 21 March for discussions with the ABRI Kodam commander.²¹

On 23 March 1983, Colonel Purwanto met with Xanana Gusmão at Buburaque – see photograph below. Participants included (left to right): Berliku, Veríssimo Dias Quintas, Colonel Purwanto, Xanana Gusmão, Bere Malai Laka (partially obscured). ABRI

¹⁵ See Taylor, J.G., *Indonesia’s Forgotten War*, 1991, pp.136-137 for Fretilin’s letter of proposals passed to Colonel Purwanto. The ceasefire however was admitted in the Jakarta press on 10 June 1983 - *Chega !*, CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 418.

¹⁶ Author’s discussions with F-FDTL Lieutenant Bersama (Mário Baptista), Tasi Tolu, 27 July 2005.

¹⁷ *Tripida* – in Bahasa: *Tri Pimpinan Daerah* (Regional Leadership Triumvirate) comprising *Camat*, *Dandim*, and *Kapolsek* (Sub-district administrator, military commander and police commander).

¹⁸ As related in the Ailebere village report to the CAVR – the initial meeting took place on 1 January, and the second meeting on 3 January 1983.

¹⁹ The exact dates, sequence and locations of the March 1983 meetings are not fully clear - but the following descriptions are based on a combination of text reports and an analysis of photographs of the meetings.

²⁰ A tape recording of this meeting was reportedly carried to Portugal by the outgoing Apostolic Administrator, Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes – for a summary see Jolliffe, J. (ed), *Timor Newsletter*, Vol II, No 3, October 1983, pp. 8-9. A typed four-page Portuguese-language transcript of the meeting – with manuscript sidenotes ie: “*Conversa Entre As Autoridades e o Comandante Militar Resistencia Xanana*” is held in the *Arquivo ho Museu*, Dili. Frederico da Costa, brother of Victor da Costa, was reportedly present as interpreter – and is mentioned in Governor Carrascalão’s account - Carrascalão, M.V., *Timor – Antes do Futuro*, 2006, p.182. Frederico was killed in a clash with ABRI in 1988. *Chega !* CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 410 relates that Falintil attendees also included José da Conceição and Okan ie Okanobú. Conboy, K., *Kopassus*, 2003, p. 299 reports three meetings in the Ossú area with Xanana earlier in March, followed by the major Purwanto/Xanana meeting on 21 March – with a separate Carrascalão/Xanana meeting two days later on 23 March 1983.

²¹ *Chega !*, CAVR Final Report, Part 3, para 410. Kodam XVI Udayana was commanded by Major General Dading Kalbuadi (see also footnotes 326 and 417) until May 1983 when replaced by Major General Soetarto. Kodam XVI was retitled Kodam IX /Udayana on 9 April 1985.

Major Stevanus Gatot Purwanto is not shown. ABRI Major Iswanto also reportedly attended.²²




During the meeting, Colonel Purwanto summoned Governor Mário Carrascalão from Dili to participate.²³ Mário Carrascalão flew from Dili and met with Xanana Gusmão at Lari Guto (Ossú de Cima village – about 9 kilometres southwest of Venilale), ie nearby but not at the Buburaque venue.²⁴ Mário Carrascalão has related that Colonel

²² Major Iswanto – an ABRI “Tetum-speaking field commander, affected Falintil surrenders in 1979 and 1980 and offered amnesties. Xanana Gusmão described Iswanto as “cunning and murderous” - Niner, S., Xanana - Leader of the Struggle ..., 2009, op.cit., p.60 – see also p.47, p.91. Iswanto’s contact with Falintil is also mentioned briefly in *Chega!* CAVR Final Report.

²³ Governor Carrascalão first publicly admitted to his discussions with Xanana in an article in The Jakarta Post of 10, 11 July 1983 – Saldanha, J.M., The Political Economy ..., 1994, p.120; Singh, B., East Timor: Myths And Realities, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore, 1995, p.127. See also Carrascalão’s remarks to an Australian parliamentary delegation on 28 July 1983 – Morrison, W.L., Official Report of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation, No. 154/1983, Canberra, 1983, pp.151-152; and “*Mário hakerek istoria Larigutu ...*”, Suara Timor Lorosae, Dili, 31 August 2005. Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, The War ..., 1984, p.72 notes Fretilin rejected an Indonesian proposal that Carrascalão be the principal representative of the Indonesian side. Governor Carrascalão relates his one-hour meeting with Xanana Gusmão on 23 March in Carrascalão, M.V., *Timor – Antes do Futuro*, 2006, pp.177-193.


²⁴ Colonel Purwanto participated – but does not appear in photographs. Attendees included: Veríssimo/Viríssimo Dias Quintão, Bere Malai Laka, Fera Lafaek, Okan Onobú, Lava Koli Mau, Mau Buti, and ABRI Major Stevanus Gatot Purwanto. These meetings are covered in the pamphlet “Fretilin Conquers the Right to Dialogue” published by Fretilin in 1983 that reports the meetings on 21 and 23 March at “Lari Gutu” in the Fretilin “military region of Nakroma”. The pamphlet included a colour photograph of Colonel Purwanto and

Purwanto “asked me to go to Larigutu ((sic)), because he had run out of arguments in his debate with Xanana. So they prepared a helicopter ... The meeting with Xanana lasted forty five minutes ... I sat next to Xanana, in front of us was a Fretilin flag.”²⁵



Governor Mário Carrascalão, Xanana Gusmão, Bere Malai Laka - Lariguto

A few days later, the East Timor-wide ceasefire agreement was concluded. Subsequently, the first of several local agreements was signed in Moro (in Lautém - a sub-village of Parlamento north of Los Palos) by the Fretilin Eastern Region (*Ponte Leste*) political commissar with the Los Palos-based military district commander (ie, Dandim 1629 - an ABRI lieutenant colonel).



March 1983 – Mau Huno, Bere Malai Laka, Lere Anan Timor
- Falintil “Gatott” camp (Bibileu area, Viqueque)²⁶

Xanana Gusmão at “Lari Guto” on the front cover – but this is more likely a photograph taken earlier at Buburaque.

²⁵ Anderson, B., Djati, A. & Kammen, D.; “Interview with Mário Carrascalão”, Indonesia, 76, Cornell University, Ithaca, October 2003, p.6. Later, at the end of May 1983, Carrascalão met with Xanana for about 18 hours at Ariana – also related in the “Interview” article. Carrascalão has also stated that the meeting took place on 28 May 1983 – “Mario Viegas Carrascalao: ‘*Saya Bukan Pengkhianat*’ ” (I am not a Traitor), Tempo, Jakarta, 17 September 2001. Detail of the late May 1983 Meeting is in: Kammen, D., “A Tape Recorder and a Wink?, Transcript of the May 29, 1983, Meeting Between Mário Carrascalão and Xanana Gusmão”, Indonesia, 87, April 2009, pp.73-102.

In mid-April 1983, General Moerdani – as ABRI Commander, briefly visited East Timor and met with Governor Mário Carrascalão at Baucau airport on 13 April. Moerdani reportedly told Carrascalão that Brigadier Soetarto (Kodam Udayana Commander) and Colonel Purwanto – with any necessary assistance from Governor Carrascalão, would continue with the peace discussions for a further three months and resolve matters peacefully.²⁷ However, on Moerdani's departure, Colonel Purwanto confided to Carrascalão that Moerdani's visit had "killed his career". Eight days after the meeting at the airport in Baucau (ie on 21 April 1983), Colonel Purwanto reportedly told Governor Carrascalão: "What I feared most is already happening. The peace process is already being sabotaged by Captain Prabowo Subianto, son in law of President Soeharto. He was in Craras²⁸. He came to Timor from Jakarta and left without giving me notice or advising of the reasons that brought him here. No civil or military personnel are authorized to enter this territory without my knowledge. He's up to something."

During the 1983 ceasefire period, Falintil increased its contact with the remaining *Klandestin* in the villages and towns²⁹ and made progress in suborning and recruiting Hansip members as *Klandestin* cadre and sympathisers. According to Kopassu Major Stevanus Gatot Purwanto, ABRI troops met with Falintil in the towns and villages – "we say hello when we passed each other in the street".³⁰ According to one writer, armed Falintil were allowed to visit villages, ABRI helicopters took priests into the mountains to say mass for the guerrillas, and "there were even football games between the Indonesian army and guerrilla teams".³¹ In Iliomar, there were no ABRI versus Falintil soccer matches, but guerrillas and soldiers did mix at parties and dances in the Sub-District – some arranged by the *Camat*, Zé Roberto Seixas Miranda, and others by the Koramil commander, Lieutenant Rifai. Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, the Apostolic Administrator for East Timor, related that "in June, as part of the ceasefire agreement, Indonesian helicopters were taking food and medicines to guerrillas in the mountains and bringing their sick and wounded into Dili hospital" – adding that "the people were very happy with the respite from the war and for the first time in years were able to plant decent

²⁶ In March 1983, Mau Huno was Political Commissar of the Central Region (Haksolok); Bere Malai Laka was Secretary of the Department for Information, Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Region (Nakroma); and Lere Anan Timor was Political Commissar and Regional Secretary of the Eastern Region (Funu Sei Nafatin).

²⁷ Carrascalão, M.V., *Timor – Antes do Futuro*, 2006, pp.195-198.

²⁸ Craras – also as Kraras is an area about 10 kilometres southwest of Viqueque town.

²⁹ For the formation and activities of *Klandestin/Clandestina* in Dili, the Central Region and Baucau from 1983, see Pinto C., and Jardine, M., *East Timor's Unfinished Struggle*, 1997, pp.95-104. The earlier "*Arma Branca*" - Fretilin's civilian auxiliaries, and "*estafeta*" (messengers) are also described at p.51. In 1986, "there was no centralised network for all the different underground groups. Each had its own connections, with David Alex, with Mau Hodu, with Xanana Gusmão, or other guerrilla fighters in the jungle" – p.98.

³⁰ As related to Gatra journalist, Genot Widjoseno – see Lubis, "It Was A Ruthless Dispute ...", Gatra, 47/IV, 10 October 1998. As noted earlier, as a Lieutenant Colonel, Gatot Purwanto was "honourably dismissed" from ABRI in February 1992 following the deliberations of the ABRI Honour Council which investigated the 12 November 1991 "Santa Cruz Massacre" – Purwanto was the intelligence chief in East Timor in 1991 (ie Asintel Kolakops).

³¹ Jolliffe, J., *Coverup*, 2001, p.342. F-FDTL Lieutenant Colonel Aluc Descartes participated in soccer games with ABRI personnel in Los Palos – discussions with the author, Dili, 4 April 2005.

crops”.³² On 29 July, a small Australian parliamentary delegation made a very brief visit to Iliomar by helicopter and spoke with the UNICEF staff at the food distribution centre.³³

In June 1983, a courier (“*estafeta*”)³⁴ and Iliomar *Klandestin* member - Abílio Quintão Pinto³⁵, travelled from Dili to Lari Guto (via the Catholic training school at Fatumaca³⁶ south of Baucau) and met with Xanana and his staff for three nights to receive instructions on the implementation of the ceasefire in Iliomar Sub-District. Abílio Pinto also brought a new Portuguese-style camouflage uniform for Xanana.³⁷ Before departing Lari Guto for Dili one week later (again via Fatumaca), Abílio Pinto was instructed by David Alex³⁸ to take a message back to the Falintil headquarters in Iliomar advising that they must be prepared for an end to the ceasefire and ready to return to the jungle with little notice. On his return to Iliomar a week later, Abílio passed this message to the senior Falintil commander in the area, Venâncio Savio, who commanded Falintil military forces in the *Ponte Leste* region from his headquarters at Saclarin near Fuat village, and also to Carlos Correia, the Iliomar Zone Secretary and village chief of Iliomar I. Abílio Pinto then returned to his studies in Dili.

However, the Fretilin/Falintil leadership soon became concerned that the ceasefire was becoming more advantageous to the Indonesian military than the Resistance - as Resistance fighters and supporters became increasingly less committed to the Struggle. Gusmão also feared an Indonesian military offensive following the Resistance’s rejection of a late June ultimatum by General Moerdani that Falintil forces surrender.³⁹ Accordingly, Xanana Gusmão ordered a limited “*levantamento armada/parcial*” (“armed/limited uprising”) or “pre-emptive attack” against the Indonesian occupation in Viqueque and Lautém Districts.⁴⁰ Gusmão later related:

“We had to take the initiative and fixed the 17 August as the date to mark the end of the ceasefire. From the East to the Centre people were prepared to join the uprising. This action meant that we broke the ceasefire, but strategically the Indonesians had

³² Jolliffe, J. (ed), Timor Newsletter, Vol II, No 3, October 1983, p.6.

³³ Morrison, W.L., Official Report ..., 154/1983, Canberra, 1983, pp. 47-48. The Delegation noted that “the population seemed scarce, and the people did not gather together in curiosity to observe the Delegation”.

³⁴ *Chega !*, CAVR Final Report, Part 5, p.29, footnote + notes that couriers were initially termed “*ligacões*”, then “*vias de canais*” from about 1981 – with the term “*estafeta*” used from 1986. Couriers carried “mail, intelligence and goods.”

³⁵ Iliomar CNRM/CNRT Secretary to mid-2001, Iliomar Sub-District Administrator 2003-2008 – see biographical summary at Annex K.

³⁶ In mid-2003, Xanana Gusmão acknowledged that Father Eligio Locatelli of Fatumaca had played a role in facilitating the cease-fire and supporting the Resistance – see *The Age*, Melbourne, 12 July 2003.

³⁷ In meetings with the Indonesians, Xanana did not want to wear an ABRI-pattern camouflage field uniform, so a Portuguese field uniform was acquired in Dili and “re-tailored” by Maria Branca.

³⁸ David Alex Daitula (David da Costa) was the Falintil Commander of Region II in 1995 – and in 1997 was reported by ABRI as Commander Region I. He died of wounds on 25 June 1997 following a clash with ABRI in Watume sub-village, Caibada village – about three kilometres northwest of Baucau.

³⁹ Niner, S., *Xanana – Leader of the Struggle for Independent Timor-Leste*, Australian Scholarly Publishing, North Melbourne, 2009, pp.98-100.

⁴⁰ Baptista, M. (F-FDTL Lieutenant Bersama), *Falintil History (Draft)*, December 2005 - and author’s discussions with ex-Falintil senior F-FDTL commanders in Timor-Leste in 2004/2005. Several sources - including the then Governor Mário Carrascalão, contend however that the attack was precipitated by the rape of a Timorese woman by Indonesian security force personnel eg see Anderson, B.; Djati, A. & Kammen, D.; “Interview with Mário Carrascalão”, *Indonesia*, Issue 76, Cornell University, Ithaca, October 2003, pp. 9-10. The CAVR Final Report report also states members of the ABRI *Zipur* detachment had “molested” (*melecehkan*) a local woman and “this prompted a combined Falintil/Hansip attack” - Chapter 3.16, p.105, para 425.

already broken it by threatening us. ... Tactically we broke the ceasefire but strategically they broke it.”⁴¹

The attacks (were planned to occur in the Viqueque area (in the villages of Bilileo and Bua Nurak/Ossú) and in Lautém (in the villages of Mehara, Baduru, Serelau, Laikara and Leuro). In Viqueque District, Ular Rihik (Vírgilio dos Anjos – b. 14/5/1953, d. 6/1/2010) - a former Falintil fighter then commanding an ABRI paramilitary unit⁴², received an order from Xanana Gusmão⁴³ to attack a group of ABRI combat engineers (3 Zipur) in Bibileo village about 15 kilometres northwest of Viqueque town⁴⁴. Ular’s unit attacked on 8 August 1983 reportedly killing 16 ABRI engineers and a psychological warfare major.⁴⁵ Deceived by a local celebration, the Indonesian soldiers did not have access to their weapons – and the two posts were overrun in ten minutes.⁴⁶ The Other attacks against Indonesian positions were planned for 8 August in Viqueque District including: an attack on Viqueque Town and Nareka at 1700 hrs, and at Ossú Lakimata/Bua Nurak by Falur’s (Domingos Raúl – b. 9/7/1955) Ratih element, and Uaibobo at 1800 hrs.⁴⁷ However, of those planned attacks, only the attack against Uaibobo led by António Sagata (Sukarno) took place. Ular and his deserting Ratih paramilitaries joined Falintil’s 4th Company commanded by Fera Lafaek (António da Silva de Carvalho) and subsequently operated in the Waimori/Venilale/ Manatuto area. On 10 August, Falur defected to Falintil

⁴¹ Niner, S. Xanana – Leader ..., opcit., 2009, p.100.

⁴² A Falintil fighter, Ular Rihik had surrendered to ABRI in 1979 and joined Ratih in 1981. Ular Rihik’s unit was the special “Titus” platoon of the Railakan Ratih company commanded by Falur Rate Laek (Domingos Raúl) – a former Falintil fighter who had surrendered to ABRI in 1980. Concurrently, Ular was also secretly the commander of the Falintil *Miplin* battalion, and Falur was commander of its 2nd Company (author’s discussions with Falur in Dili, 8 April 2005). 19 of Ular’s men were involved in the attack. Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, *The War ...*, 1984, p. 140 suggests there were 86 Ratih deserters involved. Ular had surrendered to ABRI in 1979. He became Falintil Commander Region IV 1998-1999 - and as Major Ular was the F-FDTL Chief of Personnel in the period 2001-2008. Ular’s father, Celestino dos Anjos, had served with the Australian military’s “Z Special Unit” in Portuguese Timor during World War II – and was the only Timorese to be decorated ie awarded the Loyal Service Medallion.

⁴³ According to Ular Rihik, Xanana Gusmão’s order for the “*levantamento*” was passed from Mau Hodu (José Amancio da Costa – see footnote 624) to Lu’ Olo (Francisco Guterres - who became Fretilin Secretary in 1999 and President of the National Parliament until mid-2007) – and then to Ular who received the order in Bibileo on 1 August (author’s discussions with Major Ular Rihik, Dili, 3 August 2005). Ular also later cited as receiving Gusmão’s “letter” on 1 August – and advice that the *levantamento* was to begin on 8 August – see Grimshaw, Z. (Loiluar, R. – translator), Interview: Comandante Ular Rihik/Virgilio dos Anjos, Dili, 16 October 2009, p.21.

⁴⁴ This “old” Bibileo village is about five kilometres further north than the present-day Bibileo village.

⁴⁵ As related in *Jornal das FDTL*, 1 December 2001 - also reported as 16 ABRI engineers killed in The New York Times of 19 July 1985. Falur Rate Laek states 16 ABRI engineers were killed – and an “intelligence major” (discussion with author, Dili, 8 April 2005). The ABRI/TNI *Operasi Seroja* memorial at Cilangkap (Jakarta) lists the names of 17 ABRI personnel of 3 Zipur who died in combat in East Timor in 1983 (this represented 19.7 percent of declared ABRI casualties for 1983). The F-FDTL “*Jornal*” item also indicates Indonesian reprisals began on 7 September 1983. Ular Rihik described the attack in a letter to Captain (Retd) A.D. Stevenson dated 2 March 1984 - *Arkivu ho Muzeu*, Dili (Document 05002.004.02); and in interviews with: Jill Jolliffe – see Jolliffe, J., Balibo, 2009, op.cit., pp.307-323; and in mid-October 2009 with Zeldá Grimshaw – see Grimshaw, Z. (Loiluar, R. – translator), Interview ..., 16 October 2009, op.cit., pp.21-23.

⁴⁶ Grimshaw, Z. (Loiluar, R. – translator), Interview ..., 16 October 2009, op.cit., p.22. According to Ular Rihik, there were no Timorese casualties.

⁴⁷ Author’s discussions with Domingos Raúl - *nom de guerre* “Falur Rate Laek”, Dili, 8 April 2005 and Dignazito Mesak Ximenes Belo (“Mau Mesak Buanurak”), Baucau, 23 October 2008. According to Falur, at the time, the Falintil structure was: 1 Company (Los Palos) led by Falo Chai; 2nd Company (Matabean) - David Alex; 3 Company (Viqueque) - Rosas Ko’or Suu; 4 Company (Baucau area) - Fera Lafaek; 5 Company (Same area), - *Comandante Mer*; and 6 Company (western border area) - Venâncio Ferraz (Feras).

with his Ratih company (second in command Roque Soares Baptista – Sai La Fila⁴⁸) – comprising 96 personnel with 79 weapons, and joined Falintil’s 3rd Company led by Rosas Ko’o Susu (Ko’or Suu) Henriques⁴⁹, and the group moved to the Aitana/Baucau area.

The attack on the ABRI engineers at Bibileu by Ular’s group was included in the 1993 criminal indictment by the Indonesians against Xanana Gusmão – who had been captured in Dili on 20 November 1992, as follows:

“In August 1983, an attack on a combat engineer unit in the village of Klaras (sic) was led by Ologari, Mau Kalo, David Alex, Taur Matan Ruak, Vera Lafaek, Mau Hudu and Kilik that resulted in a section of the combat engineer battalion being killed, 17 SP-1 rifles seized and an armed platoon of Hansip captured.”⁵⁰

Other influences precipitating an end to the ceasefire reportedly included General Moerdani’s 8 August announcement of forthcoming “clean-up” operations and Falintil’s 10 August attack on the military section of Dili airport – but these “post-date” Ular’s attack on the ABRI Zipur element at Bibileo on 8 August. Apparently in reprisal, in late August or September, ABRI killed 200-300 villagers in the Kraras area⁵¹ – which became known as the “village of widows”, and the massacre was widely reported.⁵²

In Iliomar, the ceasefire was broken on Sunday 8 August 1983 when Hansip members killed two Falintil during a “*kontak damai*” (peaceful contact) meeting at Hamabere (on Dirilofor Hill, just north of Caentau sub-village). Four Hansip (José Madeira, Adão Cabral, Mateus Baros, Julião Teles) met with the two Falintil (Venâncio Savio, previously of Cacaven village – the leader; and Amilcar/Amilgar Rodrigues, previously of Vatamatar sub-village) at a buffalo pen at Hamabere at about 1400 hrs. The two Falintil proposed that the Iliomar Hansip join in an attack on ABRI in Iliomar on the following evening - to be led by the local Falintil commander Armando Nolasco (*nom de guerre* “Koro Asu”).⁵³ Fearful of repercussions if such an attack was undertaken, the

⁴⁸ Discussions with Roque Soares Baptista – Falintil *nom de guerre* “Sai La Fila”, Dili, 27 June and 2 July 2007. Roque Baptista, of Caraubalo village (Viqueque) was *Adjunto Politico* of *Região II* in 1999.

⁴⁹ José Rosas/Rojas (Ko’o Susu) Henriques was killed by ABRI on 6 August 1987 (widow is Bi Lou Mali).

⁵⁰ Suwara, I. Ketut, SH, *Surat – Dakwaan: Perkara ...*, 25 January 1993, para 9.1, pp.6-7.

⁵¹ Kraras is an area about 10 kilometres southwest of Viqueque town, not a specific location – sometimes spelt “Cararas” (Carrascalão, M.V., *Timor – Antes do Futuro*, 2006 – see footnote 511).

⁵² In 2008, the Timor-Leste Parliament established 17 September as a national holiday to commemorate the “Kraras Massacre” – Radio and Televizasaun Timor-Leste, 16 September 2008. For accounts of Kraras, see: Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, *The War ...*, 1984, p.140; Taylor J.G., *Indonesia’s Forgotten War*, 1991, p.102, 142, 147; and in Lubis, B., “It Was A Ruthless Dispute ...”, *Gatra*, 47/IV of 10 October 1998. Jolliffe, J., Balibo, 2009, op.cit., pp.307-323 and Jolliffe, J., *Coverup*, 2001, op.cit., pp. 286-301 and provide comprehensive accounts of the Kraras massacres and cite the killings as occurring at several sites - principally: Be-Lui (7 September) and Tahu Bein (12 September). The then Governor of East Timor, Mário Carrascalão provides detail on the killings in Anderson, B. ; Djati, A. & Kammen, D., “Interview with Mário Carrascalão”, *Indonesia*, 76, Cornell University, Ithaca, October 2003, pp. 9-10; and Carrascalão, M.V., *Timor – Antes do Futuro*, 2006, pp.226-235. Ular (see footnote 516) related the attack on the ABRI engineers on 8 August 1983 and the subsequent Indonesian reprisals in a letter (dated 2 March 1984) to the retired Australian Army officer, Captain A. D. Stevenson – who had been his father’s Z Special Unit commander in World War II. In that letter, Ular referred to the death of an ABRI Major “Sukiarjo” on 8 August – and the actions of Falur on 11 August 1983 (see Document 05002.004.002, *Arkivu ho Muzeu Rezistensia*, Dili.). At the time of writing in March 1984, Ular described his Falintil position as the “2ic of A Company of the 4th Unit of the 2nd Red Brigade”.

⁵³ According to Ular Rihik (see footnotes 522, 523), the *levantamento* was to being with a Falintil attack at Iliomar at 3pm on 8 August 1983 – “But on the 7th someone betrayed them to the Indonesians, and the Indonesians attacked them first. The messenger contacted the wrong person, and he informed the Indonesians.” - Grimshaw, Z. (Loiluar, R. – translator), *Interview ...*, 16 October 2009, op.cit., p.21.

Hansip leader, José Madeira⁵⁴ – reportedly without higher direction, shot and killed Venâncio; and Julião Teles shot and killed Amilcar. After their bodies were brought to the Koramil 03 headquarters, the villagers were summoned to the headquarters and a series of arrests began – including the arrest of all six village heads in Iliomar.⁵⁵

The Resistance undertook other actions across Lautém District on 9 August - with the largest occurred at Mehara village, 30 kilometres east of Los Palos. The “*raja*” of Mehara, Miguel dos Santos, led all the villagers into the forest – reportedly taking with them 78 Hansip weapons and also weapons from the police - including a Brimob machine gun. These events were followed by large-scale ABRI reprisals in the Mehara area, principally by ABRI’s Yonif 641, Yonif 100 and Kopassus troops.⁵⁶ In Leuro village, 10 kilometres south-west of Los Palos, the ABRI Babinsa were disarmed by a group led by Rangkabian (Fernando) - a local Falintil platoon commander, and three weapons were taken into the jungle; and in Laleno village, about 20 kilometres north-west of Los Palos, where over 30 weapons were seized from Hansip and taken into the jungle by villagers. In Serelau, Laikara and Baduru villages (in Moro Sub-District about 15 kilometres northwest of Los Palos) *Raja* Edmundo reportedly also led villagers who joined Falintil in the forest.

Many Iliomar people believe that the killings of the two Falintil at Hamabere in Iliomar on 8 August caused the breakdown of the Province-wide ceasefire. However, as noted above, the Iliomar incident was only part of a broader Resistance plan to abandon the ceasefire - ie *levantamento armada/parcial*, with attacks across both Viqueque and Lautém Districts.⁵⁷

With the failure of the ceasefire, “command and control” of ABRI units in East Timor by Korem 164 was returned to ABRI Headquarters in Jakarta who formed Koopskam (*Komando Operasi Keamanan* – Security Operations Command) to manage operations in the Province.⁵⁸ Subsequently, ABRI’s *Operasi Persatuan* (Operation Unity) - launched in August 1983, resulted in further Falintil casualties and surrenders⁵⁹. Falintil surrenders were usually negotiated beforehand through village heads or family members.

⁵⁴ José Madeira was also an Indonesian public servant (*pegawai negeri sipil* – PNS) at this time. Adão Fernandes Cabral became an Indonesian public servant - and was subsequently murdered - by persons unknown, in Luro on 11 September 1995 while serving as the head of Luro Sub-District (ie *Camat*). Cabral had opposed the building of a mosque in Luro and had vigorously defended his stance against the local military and police authorities. Julião Teles was killed at Tirilolo village during the Falintil attack on Iliomar on 8 January 1985. Mateus Baros lived in Dili (2004), and José Madeira lived in Iliomar I until his death by disease in June 2002.

⁵⁵ *Chega !*, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, para 544 notes that all the village chiefs had been in contact with Fretilin/Falintil during the ceasefire period.

⁵⁶ See *Chega !*, CAVR Final Report, Chapter 7.2, para 542, 551-554, Table 22 (p.179). Ten (or 33) Hansip from Mehara reportedly defected to Falintil on 8 August 1983.

⁵⁷ Some sources contend however that ABRI “unilaterally” broke the ceasefire and/or conducted “bad faith” violations of the ceasefire - while others suggest that Ular’s attack on the Zipur 3 camp at Bibileu was precipitated by ABRI molestation of local women – see preceding footnotes 516, 525.

⁵⁸ Koopskam was replaced by Kolakops (*Komando Pelaksana Operasi* – Operations Implementation Command) in October 1989 with regional command and control returned by Jakarta to Kodam IX/Udayana in Bali – see footnotes 604 and 605.

⁵⁹ An “amnesty” was first announced by President Soeharto on 17 August 1977. Villagers colloquially termed surrendering by Falintil as “*turun*” - ie Bahasa “to come down”. Those who surrendered were pressed for information about Falintil, and ABRI officers have commented that many readily assisted the Indonesian security forces – see also ABRI Instruction “System of Security ...”, Document 2 in Budiardjo C. and Liem Soei Liong, *The War...*, 1984, p.195 noting Falintil “motives prove to be very shallow because once they are captured and given the chance to live, the very same day they will start opposing the GPK or their comrades still in the bush”. Kopassus claimed to be able to “turn” a Falintil prisoner in three hours – see Conboy, K., *Kopassus*, 2003, p. 310. Apart from Alarico Fernandes, several other prominent Fretilin cadre surrendered and assisted ABRI eg Lari Sina (Abel Freitas Ximenes) and Olo Kasa (Lino Monteiro) in early 1979 – see Gusmão, X. (Niner, S. ed), *To Resist ...*, 2000, p.59.

However, many of the ABRI promises of rewards were not met and, following a “grace” period, the Falintil returnees were often discriminated against and abused.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ ABRI instructions for the interrogation of Resistance members who had surrendered or had been captured were detailed in *Prosudur Tetap* (Standing Procedures) PROTAP/01-B/VII/1982 issued by Korem 164 (Dili) in July 1982. These instructions directed that interrogators were not to use violence or threats – “except in certain situations where the subject under interrogation has difficulty telling the truth (being evasive)”, p.5. If violence was used, care was to be taken that such remained secret ie out-of-sight, no photographs etc. This PROTAP, in Bahasa, can be found at website of the *Arkivu ho Muzeu Rezistensia*, Dili, within Document 06449.046 (“Kodim 1628/06 – Bakau Timtim, Baurah”).